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REMAINING SILENT WHILE POLICE GET 
FRISKY:  AFTER SALINAS, CAN SILENCE 
DURING A TERRY STOP BE USED AS AN 
ADMISSION OF GUILT? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Genovevo Salinas is at home watching a football game when there is 
a knock at his door.1  The police are outside and request to come in to ask 
him some questions.2  Mr. Salinas is cooperative, admits that he owns a 
gun, and surrenders it to the officers.3  The officers then ask him to come 
down to the station to answer a few more questions, and he goes to the 
station voluntarily.4  The officers do not place Mr. Salinas in custody, and 
therefore, they do not read him his Miranda rights.5 
After an hour, the officers ask Mr. Salinas if the gun that was turned 
over at his house would match a ballistics test on the bullet from a 
murder.6  Mr. Salinas does not want to answer that question, so he does 
not say anything.7  The officers do not know why Mr. Salinas does not 
answer the question, although, they have their suspicions.8  Mr. Salinas is 
nervous, he starts to shuffle his feet, looks down, and wrings his hands 
from the anxiety.9  Mr. Salinas’ actions, along with his silence, are now 
evidence for the prosecution to use against him in a criminal case.10 
                                                 
1 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (discussing a similar situation where 
the police went to the Salinas’ home with a search warrant believing Salinas to be the shooter 
in a death at a party he attended the previous night).  This hypothetical is based off the facts 
of Salinas, but has been generalized by the author to provide a brief understanding. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 2177. 
6 See id. (noting that the petitioner voluntarily answered the questions asked by the 
officers until he felt that he should no longer answer questions that might incriminate him). 
7 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178.  The Court mentions that Salinas “balked” when he was asked 
by the officers if the shotgun recovered at the Salinas’ home would make a positive match to 
the shell casings found at the murder scene.  Id. at 2177. 
8 See id. at 2185 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (indicating that the prosecution believed that an 
innocent person would have denied partaking in the crime or being at the scene). 
9 See id. at 2178 (describing how Salinas behaved during the silence of the interrogation).  
“[P]etitioner declined to answer.  Instead, petitioner ‘[l]ooked down at the floor, shuffled his 
feet, bit his bottom lip, cl[e]nched his hands in his lap, [and] began to tighten up.”  Id. 
(internal citations omitted). 
10 See id. at 2183 (explaining that Salinas did not just remain silent, but that he made 
movements).  These movements suggested to the Court that Salinas felt surprised and 
anxious.  Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183.  The Court further questioned “[a]t precisely what point 
such reactions transform ‘silence’ into expressive conduct” is a difficult decision to have to 
make, and that the Court would not have to rule on that at this time.  Id. 
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An officer finds a group of young men on the sidewalk in front of the 
victim’s apartment.11  The officer believes one of the men, Gerry, matches 
the description of a suspect whom police previously identified as a 
possible perpetrator.  Therefore, the officer has reasonable suspicion to 
stop and frisk him.12  Gerry remains silent when the officer questions him 
because he does not want to incriminate himself, nor does he want any 
trouble with the police.  He thinks that he is making less trouble for 
himself by remaining silent.  However, because he did not tell the officer 
he intended to invoke his right to remain silent, Gerry may have lost his 
privilege.13 
In Salinas v. Texas, the Court determined that silence is considered 
tantamount to taking time to think of a lie.14  Silence is not seen as invoking 
one’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.15  To protect Salinas’ right 
against self-incrimination, the Court held he must expressly invoke that 
                                                 
11 This part of the hypothetical is created by the author in an attempt to show how the 
holding in Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013), would be applied to Terry stops and the 
need for a model code that has a pre-arrest warning similar to a Miranda warning. 
12 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (holding that police officers may briefly detain 
and pat-down suspects believed to be armed and a danger to themselves or others).  See also 
Randall S. Susskind, Race, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, and Seizure, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
327, 328–29 (1994) (detailing the reasonable articulable suspicion standard of a Terry stop).  
Officers may stop and frisk a suspect without first obtaining a warrant; however, the stop 
must be brief and justified by reasonable articulable suspicion.  Id.  The suspect is not under 
arrest, but is detained nonetheless.  Id. at 329.  The stop must be minimally intrusive and last 
no longer than needed to “effectuate the purpose of the stop.”  See id. (holding that if the stop 
is too lengthy or if the search is too intrusive, it is considered an arrest).  Reasonable 
articulable suspicion is more than a hunch and requires an officer to be able to point to 
“specific and articulable facts, which when taken together with rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion.”  Id. 
13 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (holding that the petitioner failed to assert the privilege, 
and, therefore, his Fifth Amendment claim was rejected).  See also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 
560 U.S. 370, 383 (2010) (finding that prolonged silence after being given the Miranda 
warnings was also not sufficient to invoke their protection); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 
420, 425, 427 (1984) (holding that a witness who desires protection of the privilege must claim 
it); Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 560 (1980) (determining that a defendant usually 
does not invoke privilege by remaining silent).  “[A]n express invocation requirement 
ensures the prosecution is put on notice whether a suspect is claiming the privilege so that it 
may either challenge the claim that the testimony is self-incriminating to a judge, or, if it 
agrees, offer immunity to the suspect.”  Robin B. Murphy, Silence as Self-Incrimination After 
Salinas v. Texas, 102 ILL. BAR J. 184, 186 (2014). 
14 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182. 
15 Id.  The Court found that Salinas “might [have] decline[d] to answer [the] police officer’s 
question in reliance on his constitutional privilege.  But he also might [have done] so because 
he [was] trying to think of a good lie, because he [was] embarrassed, or because he was 
protecting someone else.”  Id. 
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right.16  In other words, he must assert the Fifth Amendment privilege, or 
none is given.17  This presents a problem for non-custodial suspects.18  This 
Note will apply Salinas to another example of a non-custodial 
interrogation, a Terry stop, to demonstrate how suspects can unknowingly 
have their silence used against them.19  A Terry stop is when a police officer 
has reasonable suspicion to briefly stop a suspect whom the officer 
believes to be participating in criminal activity.20  If the same rule of law 
applies to a Terry stop, individuals like Gerry will not know how to protect 
themselves or guarantee their constitutional right against self-
incrimination.21 
                                                 
16 Id. at 2178.  The Court identified that for a long period of time, it has recognized that 
the privilege “‘generally is not self-executing’ and that [if] a witness . . . desires its protection 
[he] ‘must claim it.’”  Id. 
17 Id.  The Court found that because Salinas was “required to assert the privilege to benefit 
from it,” the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas denying his Fifth Amendment claim was 
affirmed.  Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178. 
18 See infra Part III.B (describing how the Court leaves non-custodial silence as admissible 
evidence during the prosecution’s case). 
19 See infra Part III.B (explaining how a suspect’s silence is now able to be used as 
incriminating evidence). 
20 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968) (holding that the investigating officer did not 
violate the rights of the suspect because the officer had the right to pat down the outer 
clothing of the man).  The officer had “reasonable cause to believe” that the suspect may have 
been armed.  Id.  The Court “distinguished between an investigatory ‘stop’ and an arrest, 
and between a ‘frisk’ of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence 
of crime.”  Id.   It further held that it was a necessity in the “officer’s investigatory duties,” 
because had he not, the police officer could have been a victim.  Id.  It found that a loaded 
pistol discovered during a reasonable frisk is therefore admissible.  Id.  See Eugene L. Shapiro, 
Miranda Warnings and Terry Stops:  Another Perspective, 15 BARRY L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) 
(explaining that an officer who does not have probable cause, but whose “‘observations lead 
him reasonably to suspect’ that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about 
to commit a crime, may detain that person briefly so that the officer may investigate the 
circumstances that provoke suspicion”).  The stop and frisk must be “reasonably related in 
scope to the justification for their initiation.”  Id.  The officer is allowed to ask the suspect 
questions to determine his identity and “to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling 
the officer’s suspicions.”  Id.  However, the suspect is not required to respond.  Id.  If the 
answers do not “provide the officer with probable cause to arrest him,” the officer must 
release the suspect.  Id.  See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (concluding that 
Terry stops are non-coercive, thus are not subject to the dictates of Miranda).  The Court 
likened Terry stops to ordinary traffic stops and held that “persons temporarily detained 
pursuant to such stops are not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda.”  Id. 
21 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (holding that before Salinas “could rely on the privilege 
against self-incrimination, he was required to invoke it”).  See also Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 19, Salinas v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (No. 12-246) (arguing how 
unfair it is to enforce a rule in which the person does not possess the “magic words” that are 
required to invoke the right). 
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Many Americans are aware they have the right to remain silent, but 
are unaware that they must expressly claim their right.22  The Court has 
held that a person is obligated to let his intentions be known if he plans to 
invoke his Miranda right during an interrogation.23  Following Salinas, the 
recent Court decision on which the first part of the hypothetical is based, 
this Note will evaluate the following:  (1) what the Miranda warning 
actually says; (2) what it means; and (3) when the Miranda warning is 
necessary.24  This Note will provide a solution that will help inform 
Americans that their silence can be used against them at the time of 
questioning, similar to the way the Miranda warning is currently utilized.25 
The problem now is whether a suspect may remain silent during a 
Terry stop if he does not invoke the self-incrimination privilege, and if he 
does remain silent, whether that silence equates to guilt.26  This Note 
examines how Salinas v. Texas blurs the manner in which the privilege 
against self-incrimination is to be applied to suspects in pre-arrest, non-
custodial situations.27  First, Part II details the Fifth Amendment, the 
inception of the Miranda warnings, the holding in Salinas, and the non-
custodial interrogation during a Terry stop.28  Next, Part III analyzes how 
the holding of the Court in Salinas, when applied to a Terry stop 
interrogation, will infringe upon the fundamental rights of suspects to 
remain silent.29  Finally, Part IV proposes a model act, requiring that 
                                                 
22 See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & MARY L. PITMAN, THE MIRANDA RULING:  ITS PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 86 (2010) (finding that even casual television watchers recognize, and 
may have memorized, the lines of the Miranda rights).  See also Meaghan Elizabeth Ryan, Do 
You Have the Right to Remain Silent?:  The Substantive Use of Pre-Miranda Silence, 58 ALA. L. 
REV. 903, 903 (2007) (explaining that television police and law dramas have made the right 
to remain silent as probably the most well-known constitutional right). 
23 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (illustrating that the Fifth Amendment privilege is not self-
executing; it must actually be claimed to invoke privilege, and when it is not claimed, the 
privilege is rejected). 
24 See infra Part II.A.2 (elaborating on the narrowing of the decision in Miranda v. Arizona). 
25 See David W. Schultz, Anything You Say, Officer, 6 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 165, 165 
(1996–97) (explaining that the language which officers read is mass produced on Miranda 
cards and used as “crib sheets” that officers carry for when they make arrests). 
26 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the problem that Salinas creates for Terry stops).  See also 
infra Part III.B (addressing how Salinas narrows the protections of the right against self-
incrimination). 
27 See infra Parts II–IV (discussing the decision in Salinas v. Texas and using the Terry stop 
as a common non-custodial interrogation example to discuss how the decision in Salinas will 
infringe upon the fundamental right to remain silent for suspects in a Terry stop). 
28 See infra Part II (elaborating on the history of the Fifth Amendment privilege, the 
inception of the Miranda warning, the decision of the Court in Salinas v. Texas, and the Terry 
stop as a common non-custodial interrogation with the police). 
29 See infra Part III (analyzing the use of a suspect’s silence in a non-custodial interrogation 
such as the Terry stop, and how it will infringe on the fundamental right to remain silent that 
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suspects be informed of their rights in non-custodial situations, but more 
specifically in Terry stops.30  In turn, the model act clarifies how Salinas is 
to be applied during Terry stops.31 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The Constitution provides protections for the people of the United 
States.32  The courts are granted the power of judicial review to interpret 
the law by Marbury v. Madison, and it is with that power that the Supreme 
Court has stripped away constitutional protections.33  Part II.A will first 
explain the foundation of the Fifth Amendment and discuss how the 
Court laid the foundation for applying the Miranda warning.34  Next, Part 
II.B will show the Court’s use of Miranda in Salinas to determine that a 
suspect in a non-custodial context does not need to be read the Miranda 
warning.35  Further, Part II.C will explain how Terry stops became normal 
police procedure and acceptable by the Supreme Court.36 
A. The Fifth Amendment Grants Protections, Which Remain Fundamental 
Rights 
The Constitution gives people the right to protect themselves against 
self-incrimination in a criminal case.37  However, the Bill of Rights was 
                                                 
has come to be understood by Americans to mean that they may just remain silent to invoke 
the Fifth Amendment privilege). 
30 See infra Part IV (proposing a model code that can be adopted by the states outlining 
verbiage to be used before interrogating a suspect to inform them of their rights, and how to 
invoke those rights). 
31 See infra Part IV (illustrating how the model code will explain a suspect’s rights during 
a non-custodial interrogation). 
32 See infra Part II.A (providing a background to the fundamental rights provided in the 
Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination). 
33 See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 138 (1803) (holding that the Court has the power 
of judicial review).  See also Michael Stokes Paulson, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2709 (2003) (explaining that the Constitution granted the power to the 
courts, and not the other branches of government, to interpret and apply the Constitution to 
the cases a court reviews); infra Part II.A (discussing the narrowing of the application of the 
Fifth Amendment). 
34 See infra Part II.A (explaining the foundation of the Fifth Amendment and its exceptions 
formed by a two prong test). 
35 See infra Part II.B (detailing the use of Miranda to determine the holding in Salinas, and 
how that decision led to an infringement of rights). 
36 See infra Part II.C (providing depth into Terry stops and reasonable suspicion, high 
crime areas, and flight as factors in a stop and frisk). 
37 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself . . . .”).  
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written to include only the federal government, not the individual states.38  
Since the founding fathers drafted the Constitution, it has been a 
fundamental right for an accused person to remain silent.39  Under this 
right, suspects are treated differently than witnesses and are not legally 
required to answer questions from police.40  In 1963, there were no legal 
consequences for suspects who refused to answer police questioning.41  
Suspects being interrogated, therefore, were not protected under the Fifth 
Amendment, but were only protected under the due process right not to 
be forced to give a coercive confession.42  The right changed in 1966 by 
applying the self-incrimination clause to police investigations as a direct 
result of case law.43  A suspect’s false confession, which sometimes leads 
to an conviction as a result of coercive police actions, is one reason for the 
Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona.44 
The Court struck a balance of powers between the police and suspects 
when it required police to provide warnings to suspects indicating the 
difference between voluntary and involuntary statements.45  Part II.A.1 
                                                 
38 See Louis Henkin, “Selective Incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 
74 (1963) (explaining that the Court had held in Twining v. New Jersey that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not apply to the states). 
39 See ALLEN M. GOLDSTEIN & NAOMI E. SEVIN GOLDSTEIN, EVALUATING CAPACITY TO 
WAIVE MIRANDA RIGHTS 11 (2010) (elaborating on the Fifth Amendment incorporated British 
common law on the right to silence).  The book stated the following:   
So deeply did the inequities of the ancient system impress themselves 
upon the minds of the American colonists that the States, with one 
accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part 
of their fundamental law . . . became clothed in this country with the 
impregnability of a constitutional enactment. 
Id. 
40 THE MIRANDA DEBATE:  LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 2 (Richard A. Leo & George C. 
Thomas III eds., 1998). 
41 Id. 
42 See id. (explaining the development of parallel doctrines by the Court).  Due Process 
prohibits the police from using coercion, and it is also called the “voluntariness doctrine” to 
differentiate from the Fifth Amendment privilege, which protects against self-incrimination.  
Id. 
43 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  See also WRIGHTSMAN & PITMAN, supra note 22, at 4 (explaining how Miranda 
extended the Fifth Amendment to permit the termination of questioning during police 
interrogations); THE MIRANDA DEBATE:  LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING, supra note 40, at 35 
(illustrating how the use of the self-incrimination clause kept legislatures from adding 
language to the Sixth Amendment to regulate police interrogation). 
44 See WRIGHTSMAN & PITMAN, supra note 22, at 4 (stating that the majority of justices 
feared the actions of the police against suspects of a crime).  See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–
68 (finding the right to remain silent applies to in-custody interrogations). 
45 See GOLDSTEIN & SEVIN GOLDSTEIN, supra note 39, at 10 (providing an explanation of the 
Court’s opinion that there needed to be a level playing field between police and suspects in 
Miranda).  See also Roscoe C. Howard Jr. & Lisa A. Rich, A History of Miranda and Why it 
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will focus on the creation of the Miranda warning and explain the holdings 
of cases implementing Miranda that define how to claim the Fifth 
Amendment privilege.46  Part II.A.2 will detail the two exceptions to 
express invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege:  self-incrimination 
on the stand and government coercion.47  Further, Part II.A.2 will provide 
insight into how the subsequent Court holdings in the 1980’s have created 
a narrower application of the Miranda warning.48 
1. The Creation of the Miranda Warning 
Miranda, similar to the three other defendants in the companion cases 
to Miranda, was held in an interrogation room without access to his 
attorney.49  Miranda denied committing any crime, but was interrogated 
for so long that he was coerced into giving a confession.50  He was never 
advised that he was allowed to have an attorney present.51  The Court had 
the task of deciding if statements obtained from a defendant who was 
interrogated while in custody or “otherwise deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way” were admissible.52 
The Court held that statements Miranda made in the custodial 
interview could not be used against him.53  It further held that the 
prosecution may not address the fact that a suspect remained silent or 
                                                 
Remains Vital, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 685, 687 (2006) (explaining that the Supreme Court has not 
offered a “talismanic” definition of voluntary confessions to help determine if a question 
arises; rather, the Court will use the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
confession). 
46 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68 (providing the warning as part of case law for suspects 
during an interrogation).  The Court stated that the warning was necessary to make suspects 
aware of their rights.  Id. at 468.  The warning was required as a prerequisite to prevent the 
inherent pressures that interrogation gives.  Id.  See infra Part II.A.1 (noting the creation of 
the Miranda warning). 
47 See infra Part II.A.2 (detailing the two exceptions carved out by the Court in Griffin v. 
California, and Minnesota v. Murphy). 
48 See infra Part II.A.2 (explaining that the Fifth Amendment is not self-executing, and 
those that wish to use its protections, must claim it).  See also THE MIRANDA DEBATE:  LAW, 
JUSTICE, AND POLICING, supra note 40, at 116–17 (explaining the “code like rules” that require 
a suspect receive warnings of his rights upon being taken into custody). 
49 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440 (discussing the cases before the Court, which included:  
Vignera v. New York, 382 U.S. 925 (1965); Westover v. United States, 382 U.S. 924 (1965); 
California v. Stewart, 382 U.S. 937 (1965)).  The Supreme Court consolidated the companion 
cases into one holding in Miranda.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440. 
50 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491–92.  Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to 
a police station where he was identified by the complaining witness.  Id. at 491. 
51 Id. at 440. 
52 See id. at 445 (discussing the constitutional issue that must be decided before the Court). 
53 See id. at 492.  See also Murphy, supra note 13, at 185 (explaining that prosecutors are not 
allowed to use statements obtained during a custodial interview if the suspect has not been 
advised of his rights). 
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chose to invoke his privilege during an interrogation at the trial.54  The 
Court was then faced with how to determine when an answer was 
voluntary or compelled.55  It assumed “compulsion is ‘inherent in 
custodial surroundings.’”56 
In Miranda, the Court further created new safeguards.57  “[I]f a person 
in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in 
clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent.”58  
Further, the warning must include an explanation that “anything said can 
and will be used against the individual in court.”59  This does not prohibit 
police from questioning suspects, but “level[s] the playing field” by 
requiring officers to remind suspects of their constitutional rights.60  There 
                                                 
54 See Murphy, supra note 13, at 185 (stating that protection of the right to self-
incrimination was violated if it could be used against you in a Court). This will prove to be 
a vital holding in the analysis of how suspects in custody are afforded greater protections 
than suspects who are not in custody.  The Court held in Salinas that because the suspect was 
in a non-custodial context, he was unable to stand mute.  Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 
2178 (2013).  He must also expressly invoke his privilege, and silence during interrogation 
may be used as evidence against him during his trial.  See id. at 2178, 2182 (“A suspect who 
stands mute has not done enough to put police on notice that he is relying on his Fifth 
Amendment privilege.”). 
55 See THE MIRANDA DEBATE:  LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING, supra note 40, at 36 (explaining 
that the Miranda Court “faced the formidable challenge of developing an account of 
compulsion that overcame the conceptual and practical difficulties of the voluntariness 
doctrine”). 
56 See id. (speculating that this “bold assumption was a reasonable accommodation to the 
realities of both police interrogation and the process of judging which confessions to 
suppress”). 
57 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966) (acknowledging that “the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect 
persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way 
from being compelled to incriminate themselves”); THE MIRANDA DEBATE:  LAW, JUSTICE, 
AND POLICING, supra note 40, at 43 (providing an edited version of Miranda as an excerpt). 
58 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68.  See THE MIRANDA DEBATE:  LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING, 
supra note 40, at 43 (furnishing the reasoning of the Court).  The Court reasoned that this 
warning was for those that were unaware of the privilege; they would be made aware 
through this warning.  Id.  It further reasoned that the suspect being interrogated will then 
know that his “interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to 
exercise it . . . .”  Id. 
59 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (explaining that this added explanation was “needed in 
order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing 
it”); THE MIRANDA DEBATE:  LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING, supra note 40, at 43 (providing the 
case to readers in a text that provides other authors commentary on Miranda). 
60 See GOLDSTEIN & SEVIN GOLDSTEIN, supra note 39, at 20–21 (elaborating on the effects of 
Miranda on police questioning).  The Court ruled that:   
[A] suspect taken into custody must be warned before questioning that:  
“he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used 
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an 
attorney, and that if he can’t afford an attorney one will be appointed 
for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” 
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are many approaches to the Miranda warning because it is case law.61  
There is not a universal code in the language, but the concepts are the 
same.62  The Court has created exceptions beyond Miranda that are 
incorporated into the application of the Fifth Amendment.63 
                                                 
Id. at 21. 
61 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79 (providing case law that requires suspects in custody be 
warned of their constitutional rights); WRIGHTSMAN & PITMAN, supra note 22, at 86 (detailing 
the numerous versions of Miranda warnings).  A fifty state survey found a staggering 866 
different written Miranda warnings in federal, state, and county jurisdictions.  WRIGHTSMAN 
& PITMAN, supra note 22, at 86.  The warnings range in length from forty-nine words to 547 
words.  Id. at 87.  An example of a relatively simple Miranda warning is:   
You have the right to remain silent.  Anything you say can and will be 
used against you in a court of law.  You have the right to speak to an 
attorney and have him present before and during questioning.  If you 
cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed free of charge before or 
during any questioning, if you so desire.  Do you understand each of 
these rights I have explained to you, yes or no?  Having these rights in 
mind do you wish to speak to me now, yes or no? 
Id. at 86.  This sample Miranda even asks the suspect if he wishes to speak to the officer, so 
that “no” will be sufficient to invoke his rights.  Id.  This sample provided by Wrightsman is 
only ninety-two words.  Id.  He also provides a sample that is 172 words and more complex:   
Under the law, you cannot be compelled to answer, and you have the 
right to refuse to answer any questions asked of you while you are in 
custody.  If you do answer any such questions, the answers given by 
you will be used against you in a trial in a court of law at some later 
date.  You are also entitled to talk to a lawyer and to have him/her 
present before you decide whether or not to answer questions and while 
you are answering questions.  If you do not have the money to hire a 
lawyer, you are entitled to have a lawyer appointed without cost to 
consult with you and to have him/her present before you decide 
whether or not you will answer questions and while you are answering 
questions.  You can decide at any time, before or during the questioning, 
to exercise these rights by not answering any further questions or 
making further statements.  Knowing these rights, are you willing to 
answer questions without the presence of a lawyer? 
Id. at 86–87.  This sample is so long that the suspect may have forgotten what the first half 
said by the time the officer read the second half.  See Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda 
Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 651 (1996) (explaining that in a national poll in 
1984, statistics showed that ninety-three percent of people surveyed “knew they had a right 
to an attorney if arrested,” and in a national poll in 1991, statistics showed that eighty percent 
“knew they had a right to remain silent if arrested”). 
62 See WRIGHTSMAN & PITMAN, supra note 22, at 86 (explaining there is not one universal 
Miranda warning). 
63 See infra Part II.B.2 (describing the exceptions to the express invocation rule and the 
specific rules the Court requires for express invocation to claim the right, as well as, 
explaining non-custodial interrogations not requiring the provisions of Miranda). 
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2. The Exceptions to Express Invocation and the Narrower Application 
of the Fifth Amendment 
The Court has recognized two exceptions to express invocation of the 
Fifth Amendment:  (1) the protection against self-incrimination; and (2) 
the right against government coercion.64  Before Miranda, the Court in 
Griffin v. California held that “a criminal defendant need not take the stand 
and assert the privilege at his own trial.”65  The Court found that the 
prosecutor’s comments on the defendant’s failure to take the stand were 
in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.66  The 
Court further expressed that “[w]hat the jury may infer, given no help 
from the court, is one thing.  What it may infer when the court solemnizes 
the silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite another.”67  
Griffin provided greater protections of the Fifth Amendment by 
prohibiting the prosecution from commenting on the right against self-
incrimination during trials.68 
Additionally, the Court has held that when a witness fails to invoke 
the privilege against self-incrimination, the failure must be excused if 
there was any government coercion.69  In Minnesota v. Murphy, the Court 
held that because of the “uniquely coercive nature of custodial 
                                                 
64 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179–80 (2013) (discussing the two exceptions in 
which witnesses are not required to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege). 
65 Id. at 2179.  The Court went on to further discuss that the criminal defendant has an 
“absolute right not to testify.”  Id. 
66 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (finding that a criminal defendant has 
the fundamental right not to take the stand in a criminal prosecution, and the exercise of that 
right may not be used against him by the prosecutor during the trial).  In Griffin, the 
defendant was convicted of murder.  Id. at 609.  The Court reversed Griffin’s conviction 
because it felt the trial judge’s silence in regard to the prosecutor’s comments that Griffin 
failed to take the stand in his own defense was a penalty for exercising his constitutional 
right:  commenting on defendant’s silence at trial “cuts down on the privilege by making its 
assertion costly.”  Id. at 614.  See Murphy, supra note 13, at 185 (explaining Griffin as a 
violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege). 
67 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.  This case was actually decided before Miranda; however, it was 
used in Salinas as one exception to Miranda.  Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2179. 
68 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614 (“The inference of guilt for failure to testify as to facts peculiarly 
within the accused’s knowledge is in any event natural and irresistible, and that comment 
on the failure does not magnify that inference into a penalty for asserting a constitutional 
privilege.”). 
69 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180.  The Court discussed that Miranda held “that a suspect who 
is subjected to the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ of an unwarned custodial interrogation 
need not invoke the privilege.”  Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966)).  
See also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 57 n.6 (1964) (“The 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination has two primary interrelated facets:  The 
Government may not use compulsion to elicit self-incriminating statements . . . and the 
Government may not permit the use in a criminal trial of self-incriminating statements 
elicited by compulsion.”). 
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interrogations,” an in-custody suspect cannot voluntarily waive his 
privilege unless he does not claim it, but only after being given the 
Miranda.70  Murphy was not in custody, but rather at a probation meeting; 
therefore, the Court found that his admission to a prior rape and murder 
was not coercive.71 
In the 1980’s, before Salinas, there were two specific rules affecting the 
Miranda warning for a defendant in a criminal case:  (1) the Fifth 
Amendment is not self-executing; and (2) those who wish to have the 
protection of the Fifth Amendment, must claim it.72  The Court addressed 
the first rule, self-execution, in Roberts v. United States when it held that the 
right against self-incrimination is not self-invoking; the right must be 
expressed and in a timely fashion.73  The other rule, a witness who desired 
                                                 
70 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180.  See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429 (1984) (holding 
that a person is protected if they assert their Fifth Amendment privilege when there is a 
rational basis against self-incrimination).  In Murphy, the defendant was on probation and 
made statements that incriminated himself to his court appointed counselor.  Id. at 422.  
While on probation, Murphy was told that if he did not comply with all the court mandated 
counseling meetings and answer truthfully during his sexual counseling, that they would 
revoke his probation.  Id.  During counseling, Murphy admitted to rape and murder.  Id. at 
423.  The counselor informed the probation officer of Murphy’s confession during their 
counseling sessions.  Id. at 424.  Murphy was arrested and his statements made at the 
counseling and during the meeting with his probation officer were used against him in 
prosecution.  Id. at 425. 
 Salinas had urged the Court in his case to adopt a third exception to the express 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege.  Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180.  However, the Court 
found that precedent has held that a suspect does not invoke privilege by remaining silent.  
Id. at 2181. 
71 See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430 (explaining that the Court rejected that Murphy was entitled 
to Miranda warnings).  The Court used four factors:  (1) Murphy was not prohibited from 
asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege simply because he was on probation, in front of the 
probation officer, and required to tell the truth; (2) the probation officer was entitled to ask 
incriminating questions, which did not in turn make the privilege self-executing; (3) taking 
Murphy by surprise, by asking about prior criminal conduct, was insufficient to expect the 
Miranda warning; and (4) there was no evidence of abuse or trickery from the probation 
officer.  Id. at 431–32. 
72 See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429 (articulating that a suspect must claim the Fifth Amendment 
privilege).  See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 388–89 (2010) (explaining that silence 
was not sufficient to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege). 
73 Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 559 (1980).  Roberts, the defendant, voluntarily 
went with a woman to the United States District Attorney.  Id. at 553.  The woman was a 
known heroin trafficker.  Id.  Investigators asked Roberts if he would answer some questions.  
Id.  The investigators gave Roberts the Miranda warning before they questioned him, even 
though he was not in custody.  Id.  They also told Roberts that he was free to leave at any 
time.  Id. at 553–54.  Roberts admitted to knowing Boo Thornton, a known heroin dealer, and 
even delivering heroin to Boo.  Roberts, 445 U.S. at 554.  Roberts made several incriminating 
statements, but ultimately refused to name any suppliers of heroin during the interrogation.  
Id.  He also did not expressly invoke the Fifth Amendment.  Id.  Investigators made it known 
to Roberts that if he did not comply, it would affect the charges brought against him.  Id.  
Roberts argued that he had a constitutional right to remain silent and that the investigators 
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the protection of the Fifth Amendment must claim it, was applied in 
Murphy when the Court noted that only the accused knows which 
questions are incriminating; therefore, he must assert his privilege.74  More 
recently, in Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Court applied the second rule 
holding that prolonged silence, even after being given the Miranda 
warning, was not sufficient expression to invoke the Fifth Amendment 
privilege of protection against self-incrimination.75 
The Court determined that during non-custodial interrogations, the 
Miranda warning is not required; however, once a suspect invoked those 
privileges, the interrogations would end.76  In Mitchell v. United States, the 
defendant was not in custody when he made incriminating statements.77  
                                                 
brought negative recourse as a result of his silence.  Id. at 559.  The Court has held that the 
Fifth Amendment privilege is not self-executing and must be invoked in a timely fashion.  Id.  
Roberts was never in custody and volunteered his statements to the investigators.  Roberts, 
445 U.S. at 561.  The Court concluded that there was no error.  Id. 
74 See Murphy, 465 U.S at 429 (providing reasoning for its holding that a suspect must 
claim the privilege); Brandon L. Garrett, Remaining Silent After Salinas, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
DIALOGUE 116, 123 (2013) (stating that few will have the “moxie” to speak up against the 
police).  If the suspect wants the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege, “he must claim 
it or he will not be considered to have been ‘compelled’ within the meaning of the 
Amendment.”  Murphy, 465 U.S. at 427.  However, very few people feel like they can assert 
themselves to officers. 
75 See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382 (noting that Thompkins was silent for an extended period 
of time during questioning; he never asked for a lawyer nor stated he wished to remain 
silent).  After a shooting at a local mall in Michigan, the suspect fled.  Id. at 374.  One year 
later, Thompkins was arrested in Ohio.  Id.  The Michigan authorities travelled to Ohio to 
interrogate Thompkins.  Id.  The officers placed Thompkins in an 8’x10’ cell and gave him a 
paper to read his Miranda rights aloud.  Id. at 374–75.  During the interrogation that followed, 
at no point did Thompkins say he wished to remain silent.  Id. at 375.  After three hours of 
limited responses, the officers started asking if he believed in God, prayed to God, and 
finally, if he prayed to God for shooting that boy.  Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 376.  Thompkins 
answered yes to all of them.  Id.  He refused to sign a confession.  Id.  Thompkins claimed his 
statements were made involuntarily because he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege.  Id. 
76 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (explaining that a Terry stop is no 
different than a traffic stop in regard to custody).  See also Mitchell v. United States, 746 A.2d 
877, 890 (D.C. 2000) (finding that once a suspect has invoked his right, the officers must 
curtail the questioning).  The Court has held that a formal arrest is necessary before the police 
are required to read the Miranda warning.  Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441–42. 
77 Mitchell, 746 A.2d at 882.  In Mitchell v. United States, the defendant was sleeping where 
no overnight parking was allowed.  Id.  The officer woke Mitchell after seeing a partially 
empty liquor bottle and patted him down.  Id.  The officer asked Mitchell if he had any 
weapons.  Id. at 883.  Mitchell said that he did not.  Id.  The officer did another pat down of 
Mitchell and found a weapon in his waistband.  Id.  Mitchell claimed that the officer then 
became angry for lying to the officer, and further claimed the officer yelled at him.  Mitchell, 
746 A.2d at 883.  After searching the vehicle, the officer found a clip to a .380 semiautomatic 
pistol.  Id.  Mitchell was not in custody yet and did not receive his Miranda warnings when 
he made incriminating statements.  Id.  Mitchell was overly talkative with officers, without 
being questioned, at the police station during booking for alcohol and marijuana charges.  Id.  
Some would like to say that Mitchell had diarrhea of the mouth.  Mitchell told the officers 
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The Court found questioning during a traffic stop was similar to a Terry 
stop, therefore, the holding in Berkemer v. McCarty applied here.78  Berkemer 
found a usual traffic stop analogous to a Terry stop.79  In a Terry stop, 
unless the question posed leads to an arrest, the detainee is free to leave.80  
The Court held that because Berkemer was in a noncoercive traffic stop 
and not in custody, the officer was not required to provide Berkemer with 
a reading of the Miranda warning.81  However, the Court did acknowledge 
that no bright line rule for custody during a traffic stop could be formed 
at that time.82  The exceptions to the Fifth Amendment and the cases 
                                                 
that they only searched him because they found the clip in his car.  Id. at 884.  Mitchell, while 
being fingerprinted, said, “[D]amn I looked for that clip, I looked for that clip for four days 
now.  Where’d you find it at?”  Id. at 883.  Mitchell told officers the gun belonged to a friend.  
Mitchell, 746 A.2d at 884.  He also admitted to being charged with first degree murder back 
in 1989, and to serving time.  Id.  The officer testified that as Mitchell was talking, he might 
have responded with a head nod or “uh huh,” but that he was not interrogating Mitchell.  Id. 
78 See id. at 890 (finding that because the officer was performing a normal traffic stop, 
which have been found to be viewed similar to Terry stops, the officer was not required to 
read the suspect the Miranda warning since he was not viewed to be in custody).  Once a 
suspect invokes his privilege after he has been Mirandized, the police must respect his 
decision and curtail the questioning.  Id.  “The Supreme Court has held that for Fifth 
Amendment purposes, ordinary traffic stops are like Terry stops—though ‘significantly 
curtail[ing] the ‘freedom of action’ of the driver,’ they do not constitute ‘custody’ requiring 
Miranda warnings prior to moderate questioning of the detainee.”  Id.  Berkemer was decided 
in 1984 and held that the defendant was not in custody, therefore, his statements were not 
exempt from being used against him.  Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 429. 
79 Berkemer, 468 U.S at 439. 
80 Id. at 439–40.  The following is an explanation of what an officer may do:   
Typically, this means that the officer may ask the detainee a moderate 
number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain 
information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.  But the 
detainee is not obliged to respond.  And, unless the detainee’s answers 
provide the officer with probable cause to arrest him, he must then be 
released. 
Id.  See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (providing that unless there are “special 
circumstances,” the person may “refuse to cooperate” and leave). 
81 See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 (holding that because ordinary traffic stops are non-
coercive, temporarily detaining people in these stops is not considered “in custody” for the 
purposes of the Miranda warning). 
82 See id. at 441 (discussing that there are difficulties in “deciding exactly when a suspect 
has been taken into custody”).  The Court found there should be a rule that Miranda either 
“applies to all traffic stops or a rule that a suspect need not be advised of his rights until he 
is formally placed under arrest would provide a clearer, more easily administered line.”  Id.  
However, the Court also explained that there would be drawbacks for each of these 
scenarios.  Id.  The first drawback “substantially impede[s]” enforcing traffic laws such that 
it would force the officer to either waste his time warning every single stopped driver of their 
constitutional rights while also causing the officer to no longer be able to use self-
incriminating statements they inadvertently provided.  Id.  The justices also believed that this 
would do “little to protect citizens’ Fifth Amendment rights.”  Id.  The second drawback the 
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mentioned are used in both the defendant’s argument and the Court’s 
reasoning in Salinas. 
B.  Salinas v. Texas 
Salinas is the beginning of a change in the application of the Fifth 
Amendment to non-custodial suspects.83  The Court allowed the 
prosecution to comment on pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of 
Mr. Salinas’s guilt in a murder trial.84  First, Part II.B.1 will detail the per 
curium decision in Salinas.85  Then, Part II.B.2 will explain how the 
decision in Salinas will be implemented in the future for non-custodial 
suspects.86 
1.  Salinas:  A Decision on Pre-Arrest Silence 
As partially explained in the hypothetical in Salinas, the police were 
investigating a murder.87  Although there were no witnesses to this 
murder, a neighbor heard the gun shots and was able to see a man running 
out of the victim’s home into a dark car.88  In addition, the police were able 
to recover shot gun casings.89  The police knew that Genovevo Salinas was 
at a party at the victim’s residence the night before.90  The police paid Mr. 
Salinas a visit, he answered the door and gave them consent to search his 
home.91  Mr. Salinas was neither placed in custody, nor was he given the 
Miranda warning while officers questioned him for nearly an hour.92  
                                                 
Court noted was that it would provide a way for officers to “circumvent the constraints on 
custodial interrogations” which have been created by Miranda.  Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441. 
83 See Jesse J. Holland, Court Says Pre-Miranda Silence Can Be Used, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 
17, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/court-says-pre-miranda-silence-used-142855241.html 
[http://perma.cc/95SP-ZMJZ] (providing commentary on the Salinas case); infra Part II.B.1–
3 (providing details of the facts, plurality opinion, concurring opinion, and dissent, and 
where Salinas leaves Fifth Amendment privilege for non-custodial suspects). 
84 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2013) (allowing the prosecutor to use Salinas’ 
reactions to questions about the ballistics of the gun turned over from his possession as 
evidence of his guilt). 
85 See infra Part II.B.1 (illustrating the facts of the Salinas case). 
86 See infra Part II.B.2 (articulating the reality of the holding in Salinas as it will apply to 
non-custodial suspects choosing to invoke their Fifth Amendment right). 
87 See supra Part I (providing a brief description of the facts through a hypothetical). 
88 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Salinas v. State of Texas, 368 S.W.3d 550, 552 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011). “The investigators 
told the Salinas family about the murder investigation and obtained consent to search the 
home.  Salinas’s father tendered a shotgun to the police.”  Id.  Salinas voluntarily went to the 
police station for questioning with the officers.  Id. 
92 Id. at 553. 
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During the hour of questioning, Mr. Salinas complied and answered 
questions regarding other people who were present at the apartment 
where the shooting occurred, whether those people were gun owners, and 
how many times he had previously visited the apartment.93  Eventually, 
Mr. Salinas refused to answer the question of whether or not the ballistics 
of the shell casing would match the gun that was surrendered at his 
home.94  He instead, “[l]ooked down at the floor, shuffled his feet, bit his 
bottom lip, cl[e]nched his hands in his lap, [and] began to tighten up.”95  
During the trial, the prosecution used both Salinas’ silence and his actions 
against him.96 
The premise of Salinas’ appeal was that the Court should adopt a third 
exception to the general rule of express invocation.97  Salinas wanted the 
Court to recognize that a person’s silence is enough to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment if the officer has reason to know that the answer could be 
                                                 
93 Id. at 552.  Specifically the facts reveal that: 
During the questioning, Salinas told Sergeant Elliott he knew the Garza 
brothers through Mike Provazek and had visited the apartment three or 
four times before the shooting.  According to Sergeant Elliott’s 
testimony, Salinas said he had no disagreement with either of the Garza 
brothers and did not own any weapons aside from the shotgun police 
took into custody. 
Id. 
94 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2177 (explaining that the “petitioner balked when . . . asked 
whether a ballistics test would show that the shell casings found at the crime scene would 
match petitioner’s shotgun”). 
95 Id. at 2178. 
96 See id. at 2179 (explaining the Court had to decide “whether the prosecution may use a 
defendant’s assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination during a noncustodial police 
interview as part of its case in chief”).  The ballistics of the bullet matched the same gun 
Salinas relinquished to the officers.  Salinas, 368 S.W.3d at 554.  The prosecution would not 
have needed to comment on Salinas’ silence or conduct during the interview to provide 
evidence of his guilt.  See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (mentioning that the prosecution used 
Salinas’s reaction to the questions during the interrogation as evidence).  See also Brian 
Donovan, Why Salinas v. Texas Blurs the Line Between Voluntary Interviews and Custodial 
Interrogations, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 219 (2014) (providing  the law for what is and is not 
allowed to be commented at trial). 
97 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180.  “Petitioner urges us to adopt a third exception to the 
invocation requirement for cases in which a witness stands mute and thereby declines to give 
an answer that officials suspect would be incriminating.”  Id. at 2180–81. 
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incriminating.98  The Court ultimately did not have a majority opinion in 
this case.99 
The plurality opinion held that Salinas’ claim failed because a witness 
must assert the Fifth Amendment privilege to then be able to benefit from 
that privilege.100  The Justices made specific reference to the fact that 
Salinas “did not merely remain silent; he made movements that suggested 
surprise and anxiety.”101  The Justices then formed the opinion that they 
could avoid deciding at “precisely what point such reactions transform 
‘silence’ into expressive conduct[.]”102 
The plurality found that as long as the officers did not deprive the 
suspect of his ability to invoke the privilege, then Salinas’ constitutional 
                                                 
98 Id. at 2180 (discussing that Salinas asked the court to “adopt a third exception to the 
invocation requirement”:  when a witness stands mute, thereby declining to provide an 
answer).  The Court addressed this notion by saying that the defendant is the only person 
that can know if something is self-incriminating; therefore, he needs to say that.  Id. at 2181.  
See also Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 559 (1980) (holding that if the defendant 
wanted privilege, he should have said so). 
99 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2185 (explaining the holding of the plurality opinion and 
beginning the discussion of the dissenting opinion of the Justices). 
100 See id. at 2183 (“[W]e are not persuaded by petitioner’s arguments that applying the 
usual express invocation requirement where a witness is silent during a noncustodial police 
interview will prove unworkable in practice.”).  Id.  Justice Alito wrote the opinion and the 
Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy joined; Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred.  Id. at 2174.  
Traditionally, only plurality opinions carry authority.  Mark Allen Thurman, When the Court 
Divides:  Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 
419, 420 (1992).  Marks v. United States provided guidance for the first time in how much 
authority a plurality decision held.  See id. (“With no guidance from the Supreme 
Court, . . .  plurality decisions frequently gave rise to ‘collective confusion as to what was 
held by the Supreme Court.’”).  The finding in Marks was that in a plurality decision the 
holding can be determined to be the position of the judges that concurred on the “narrowest 
grounds.”  Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).  The reasoning behind this holding 
is that no single opinion receives the backing of five justices.  Thurman, supra note 100, at 
420.  The Marks rule is intended to be limiting to the precedential power of a case that has 
not received a majority view.  Id. at 421.  See also Larissa K. Ollivierre, Note, Suspects Beware:  
Silence in Response to Police Questioning Could Prove as Fatal as a Confession, 65 MERCER L. REV. 
579, 591 (2014) (explaining that the plurality found the government interest to be securing 
testimony). 
101 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183. 
102 Id.  The Justices decided that would be a “difficult and recurring question” and their 
decision allowed them to avoid that question.  Id.  See also Wilson v. Martin, 549 F. App’x 
309, 310 (6th Cir. 2013) (finding that probable cause did not exist when an eleven year-old 
girl raised her middle finger, and failed to stop walking away when told to stop); Swartz v. 
Insogna, 704 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that a reasonable police officer would not 
have mistaken being given the middle finger by a passenger as the car passed for a signal to 
the officer that he was in need of assistance, nor would the officer be able to have been 
concerned for the driver of vehicle simply because the passenger had “giv[en] the finger” to 
the officer as she drove past him).  These cases are examples of when the courts have ruled 
that conduct directed at an officer, for example flipping them off, does not satisfy probable 
cause; therefore, lesser conduct should also be protected.  Wilson, 549 F. App’x at 310. 
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rights were not violated.103  The Court reasoned that an express invocation 
made sure the prosecution was put on notice as to whether the suspect 
was claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege.104  The government would 
then be able to challenge the claim of privilege to a judge or offer 
immunity to the suspect.105 
In Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, he 
stated that he felt the decision in Salinas had a simple answer:  “Salinas’ 
claim would fail even if he had invoked the privilege because the 
prosecutor’s comments regarding his precustodial silence did not compel 
him to give self-incriminating testimony.”106  The Court reasoned that the 
Fifth Amendment provided that no person shall be compelled to testify 
against himself, and that just because a jury was told it could make an 
inference from the silence of the defendant, that alone did not compel the 
defendant to make self-incriminating statements.107 
A strongly written dissent penned by Justice Breyer opened with, “[i]n 
my view the Fifth Amendment here prohibits the prosecution from 
commenting on the petitioner’s silence in response to police 
questioning.”108  Justice Breyer pointed to facts not mentioned in the 
plurality opinion and referred to Griffin and Miranda to demonstrate that 
                                                 
103 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2185.  As long as police do not take away the witness’s ability to 
voluntarily invoke the privilege, the Court finds no Fifth Amendment violation.  Id.  See Neal 
Davis, Silence Is No Longer Golden:  How Lawyers Must Now Advise Suspects in Light of Salinas 
v. Texas, 38 FEB CHAMPION 16, 20 (2014) (explaining that Salinas thinned America’s Fifth 
Amendment rights, but did not destroy them). 
104 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2179 (“That requirement ensures that the Government is put on 
notice when a witness intends to rely on the privilege so that it may either argue that the 
testimony sought could not be self-incriminating.”). 
105 See id. (explaining that the government requires the knowledge of invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment).  The case said the following:   
Since a defendant’s reasons for remaining silent at trial are irrelevant to 
his constitutional right to do so, requiring that he expressly invoke the 
privilege would serve no purpose; neither a showing that his testimony 
would not be self-incriminating nor a grant of immunity could force him 
to speak.  Because petitioner had no comparable unqualified right 
during his interview with police, his silence falls outside the Griffin 
exception. 
Id. at 2179–80. 
106 Id. at 2184.  “I think there is a simpler way to resolve this case.”  Id. 
107 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that people are not 
compelled to testify because of an adverse inference).  Justice Scalia goes on to write that he 
thinks if a defendant was guilty, he will remain silent regardless of the adverse inference, 
because it would be less damaging than a cross-examination.  Id.  See Peg Green, Pre-Arrest, 
Pre-Miranda Silence:  Questions Left Unanswered by Salinas v. Texas, 7 PHOENIX L. REV. 395, 
406–07 (2013) (explaining how a witness would be compelled to testify against himself 
following the holding in Salinas). 
108 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2185. 
Smith: Remaining Silent While Police Get Frisky: After Salinas, Can Sile
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016
836 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
the plurality decision was inconsistent with Court precedent.109  Justice 
Breyer concluded that “where the Fifth Amendment is at issue, to allow 
comment on silence directly or indirectly can compel an individual to act 
as ‘a witness against himself’—very much what the Fifth Amendment 
forbids.”110  The Court further provided reasoning from Miranda that “an 
individual, when silent, need not expressly invoke the Fifth Amendment 
if there are ‘inherently compelling pressures’ not to do so.”111  The holding 
in Salinas created the ability for police officers to infringe on the right to 
remain silent for non-custodial suspects.112 
2. How Salinas Leaves Fifth Amendment Privilege for Non-Custodial 
Suspects 
Based on the holding in Salinas, suspects must tell officers explicitly 
that they plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege, or risk having 
their silence and nervous actions used in court.113  The Court reasoned that 
Salinas “might have declined to answer the officer’s question in reliance 
on his constitutional privilege.  But he also might have done so because he 
was trying to think of a good lie, because he was embarrassed, or because 
                                                 
109 See id. (providing Justice Breyer’s discussion citing to the petitioner’s brief).  Salinas was 
asked to come to the police station to clear him as a suspect.  Id.  Once at the station, he was 
taken into an interview room.  Id.  The prosecution claimed because he was free to leave at 
any time, he was not Mirandized.  Id.  The prosecutor told the jury, among other things, that 
“[a]n innocent person” would have said, “What are you talking about?  I didn’t do that.  I 
wasn’t there.”  Id.  The prosecutor went on to tell the jury, “[b]ut Salinas, the prosecutor said, 
‘didn’t respond that way.’”  Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2185.  “Rather, ‘[h]e wouldn’t answer that 
question.’”  Id.  The court said the following:   
The plurality believes that the Amendment does not bar the evidence 
and comments because Salinas “did not expressly invoke the privilege 
against self-incrimination” when he fell silent during the questioning at 
the police station.  But, in my view, that conclusion is inconsistent with 
this Court’s case law and its underlying practical rationale. 
Id.  “This Court has specified that ‘a rule of evidence’ permitting ‘commen[t] . . . by counsel’ 
in a criminal case upon a defendant’s failure to testify ‘violates the Fifth Amendment.’”  Id.  
“[I]t is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege 
when he is under police custodial interrogation.  The prosecution may not, therefore, use at 
trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.”  Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966). 
110 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2186. 
111 Id. at 2188. 
112 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the implications of Salinas for non-custodial suspects). 
113 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183 (finding that the Court precedent has held express 
invocation is required by suspects wishing to utilize the Fifth Amendment privilege).  It 
found that the requirement of express invocation allowed the government to be aware of the 
suspect’s intention.  Id. at 2179. 
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he was protecting someone else.”114  However, the Court did not expressly 
affirm the use of silence as evidence of guilt.115  Rather, the majority 
declined to address the prosecution’s allegations, “that ‘[a]n innocent 
person’ would have said, ‘What are you talking about?  I didn’t do that.  I 
wasn’t there.’”116  The dissent questioned what a suspect would have to 
say to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.117  
Therefore, the issue left open after Salinas is how a suspect involved in a 
Terry stop effectively invokes the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.118 
C. Terry Stops 
A Terry stop is a brief detention of a suspect based on a reasonable 
suspicion to pat him down for weapons.119  The purpose of Terry is to 
                                                 
114 Id. at 2176.  The Court determined that there are many other reasons to remain silent.  
Id.  It only needed to determine that the officers did not deprive the suspect of his right to 
express his wishes to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege.  Id. at 2185. 
115 See Harvey Gee, Salinas v. Texas:  Pre-Miranda Silence Can be Used Against a Defendant, 
47 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 727, 747 (2014) (discussing the implications of Marks v. United States, 
430 U.S. 188 (1977), and coming to the conclusion that one can argue that there was no 
majority opinion).  The concurring opinion did not hold a common rationale or reasoning as 
the plurality, which according to Marks, would mean that Salinas only has persuasive 
authority.  Id. 
116 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2185. 
117 See id. at 2190 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning the plurality decision that a suspect 
must “expressly invoke the privilege against self-incrimination” and whether there are 
magic words that must be used). 
118 See id. (asking the question:  “How is simple silence in the present context any 
different?”).  “[T]he officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to 
determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s 
suspicions.  But the detainee is not obliged to respond.”  Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 
439 (1984). 
119 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that where an “officer observes unusual 
conduct [leading] him reasonably to conclude [based on] his experience that criminal activity 
may be afoot and . . . the persons . . . may be armed and presently dangerous . . .  he is 
entitled . . . to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons . . . to 
discover weapons”); infra Part II.C.1 (explaining the holding in Terry, the meaning of 
reasonable suspicion, the narrowing of the Fifth Amendment privilege in Terry stops, and 
the new standard of reasonable suspicion).  The Court granted certiorari to determine if an 
officer was justified in his seizure and search of a suspect to determine if the suspect was in 
fact carrying a weapon and a threat to others.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 8.  The facts of the case were 
as follows:  Chilton and Terry were standing on a corner.  Id. at 5.  An officer observed them.  
Id. at 6.  The officer had never seen them before.  Id.  He was a veteran officer of thirty-nine 
years and worked that area checking for shoplifters and pickpockets.  Id. at 5.  As he was 
observing the two men, he saw one leave, walk down the street, pause, and look in a store 
window, walk a little further, turn around, and on the way back, stop and look in the window 
again.  Id. at 6.  Then the man rejoined the other man, and they talked for a few minutes.  
Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.  After that, the other man proceeded to do the exact same maneuvers.  Id.  
Officer McFadden watched them do this for five or six more times.  Id.  Then a third man met 
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protect the officer and the public from the potentially armed and 
dangerous suspect.120  Part II.C.1 will explain reasonable suspicion and 
how it is applied to Terry.121  Part II.C.2 will look at the new factors for a 
stop and frisk, or Terry stop:  high crime area and evasive behavior.122 
1. Terry v. Ohio 
The Court held in Terry that an officer no longer needs probable cause, 
but only a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous, as 
the threshold to constitutionally seize and search a suspect.123  The 
                                                 
up with them on the corner, and they spoke briefly.  Id.  Chilton and Terry continued pacing 
and looking for about ten more minutes and then left.  Id.  Officer McFadden believed they 
had been casing the place.  Id.  He felt that they may be carrying a gun.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.  
He stopped the gentlemen, asked them their names, and when they only mumbled back, he 
grabbed Terry by the arm and patted him down.  Id. at 6–7.  He felt a gun inside the man’s 
coat.  Id. at 7.  He pulled the men into the store, removed Terry’s coat, and pulled out a .38 
caliber revolver.  Id.  He also patted down Chilton and the third man.  Id.  Chilton had a 
revolver in his coat as well, but no weapons were found on the third man.  Id.  The officer 
arrested the men.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.  The men argued that there was no probable cause.  Id. 
at 7–8. 
120 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24 (discussing that it would be unreasonable not to allow the stop 
to “neutralize the threat of physical harm”). 
121 See infra Part II.C.1 (elaborating on the balance test that the Court used to determine 
reasonable suspicion in a Terry stop). 
122 See infra Part II.C.2 (noting the new factors, crime prone and evasive behavior, and how 
they have replaced reasonable suspicion).  In addressing where suspects are left after Salinas, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Commonwealth v. Molina, addressed that issue for its 
citizens.  See Commonwealth v. Molina, 104 A.3d 430, 432 (Pa. 2014) (determining “whether 
a defendant’s right against self-incrimination . . . is violated when the prosecution utilizes a 
non-testifying defendant’s pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt”).  The Justices 
argue the plurality and concurring decision in Salinas never actually addressed pre-arrest 
silence.  Id. at 437.  Justice Baer designated an entire section to Salinas in his opinion.  Id. at 
437–39.  He identifies that the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address a circuit 
“split between the lower courts regarding the applicability of the Fifth Amendment to the 
use of a non-testifying defendant’s precustodial silence as a substantive evidence of 
guilt . . . .”  Id. at 437–38.  However, the Court resolved the case not based on a decision about 
the pre-arrest silence, but rather on the fact that Salinas “did not expressly invoke his 
privilege against self-incrimination in response to the officer’s question.”  Id. at 438 (quoting 
Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178).  Justice Baer continued to critique the concurring opinion, finding 
that the concurring Justices also did not address the issue.  Id.  He concluded that the case 
“fail[ed] to provide guidance as to whether pre-arrest silence is ever protected under the 
Fifth Amendment if sufficiently invoked or what constitutes sufficient invocation of the 
right.”  Molina, 104 A.3d at 438.  The case in front of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied 
instead on state precedent, which found itself to be aligned with the dissenting opinion in 
Salinas.  Id.  See R. Patrick Link, To Talk or Not to Talk?  Pre-Arrest Silence in Pennsylvania, LINK 
LAW, LLC, http://linklawphilly.com/talk-talk-pre-arrest-silence-pennsylvania/ 
[http://perma.cc/DSQ3-JDS3] (providing advice from a local attorney to citizens of 
Pennsylvania regarding their pre-arrest rights in light of Molina). 
123 Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.  The Court held:   
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Supreme Court does not consider a suspect to be in custody during this 
detention because Terry stops require only reasonable suspicion.124  For 
example, the Court in Berkemer, a case that addressed Terry stops and 
whether a suspect was entitled to the Miranda warning, held that Miranda 
warnings were unnecessary, specifically because the detention was 
noncoercive and temporary.125 
However, the application of this decision has not been applied 
uniformly.126  The Circuit Courts are divided about custody in Terry 
stops.127  The circuit split hinges on the reasonableness standard for 
                                                 
When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose 
suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and 
presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be 
clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary 
measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon 
and to neutralize the threat of physical harm. 
Id.  Before Terry, the Court held that according to the Fourth Amendment, the police must 
show probable cause before interfering with the liberty or privacy interests of citizens.  Renée 
McDonald Hutchins, Stop Terry:  Reasonable Suspicion, Race, and a Proposal to Limit Terry Stops, 
16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 883, 884 (2013).  The Court in Terry found justification in a 
reasonable suspicion search.  Id. at 884–85.  The Court applied a reasonableness balancing 
test to protect both the police and the citizen.  Id. at 885.  This permitted a very limited 
exchange between the two.  Id.  The reasonableness of the stop has slowly deteriorated by no 
longer requiring police to only apply just a pat down.  See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of 
Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 192 (2004) (holding that an officer may demand identification from a stop 
and frisk suspect). 
124 See Katherine M. Swift, Drawing a Line Between Terry and Miranda:  The Degree and 
Duration of Restraint, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2006) (explaining that police are unable to 
take suspects into custody without probable cause and Terry requires only reasonable 
suspicion). 
125 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984).  The Court reasoned:   
The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort 
explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops 
are subject to the dictates of Miranda.  The similarly noncoercive aspect 
of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily 
detained pursuant to such stops are not “in custody” for the purposes 
of Miranda. 
Id.  See Daniel R. Dinger, Is There a Seat for Miranda at Terry’s Table?:  An Analysis of the Federal 
Circuit Court Split Over the Need for Miranda Warnings During Coercive Terry Detentions, 36 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1467, 1469–70 (2010) (illustrating that in Terry stops, Miranda warnings 
are not required). 
126 See Brooke Shapiro, The Invisible Prison:  Reconciling the Constitutional Doctrines of 
Coercive Terry Stops and Miranda Custody, 26 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 479, 480 (2012) 
(elaborating on the circuit split among the federal court system in regards to custody in a 
stop and frisk). 
127 See id. at 481–82 (analyzing the difficulty courts have in determining when a Terry stop 
is considered in custody, thus requiring a Miranda warning).  Cases provided as examples 
include:  United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting the 
reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment as applied to Miranda custody claims); 
United States v Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589, 590 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding there was no custody 
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determining whether suspects are given Miranda warnings in a Terry 
stop.128  In three circuits, reasonable Terry stops are not considered 
custody:  the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits.129  In four circuits, a 
reasonableness standard is irrelevant to determining custody:  the Second, 
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.130  This split in the approaches of 
determining custody affects the procedural safeguards to protect the right 
against self-incrimination.131  Defining custody for a suspect in a Terry stop 
is vital to determining whether his rights are protected.132 
There is “no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by 
balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the 
search [or seizure] entails.”133  Terry held that if the officers have 
reasonable suspicion, and they believe that the frisk will prevent harm to 
                                                 
in regards to Miranda purposes when an suspect is detained and interrogated by police); 
United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 976–77 (9th Cir. 2002) (determining reasonableness of a 
search and seizure as it relates to the Fourth Amendment and the custody issue under the 
Fifth Amendment). 
128 See Swift, supra note 124, at 1084 (explaining the Court’s reasoning for finding Terry 
either in custody or not is reasonableness of the search and seizure).  Swift concluded in her 
note that both sides were wrong.  Id.  Swift suggested a new rule for determining custody 
where the courts would balance the duration and degree of restraint rather than the 
reasonableness.  Id. at 1089.  Under duration, Swift called for a clock to start at the exact same 
time for all cases.  Id. at 1090.  During the degree of restraint analysis, the court should look 
at the actual frisk.  Id. at 1091.  Did the officer just pat down the suspect, or did he forcefully 
grab him or hold him with restraint?  Id. at 1091–92.  The suspect being refrained from leaving 
is the threshold that Swift asserted “best comports with the cases.”  Swift, supra note 124, at 
1091–92. 
129 See id. at 1085.  (“[R]easonable Terry stops [by definition] are non[-]custodial.”).  See also 
Shapiro, supra note 126, at 492–94 (explaining that there were different approaches the courts 
took to determine the reasonableness of a Terry stop, which was the threshold in some 
circuits for determining custody). 
130 See Swift, supra note 124, at 1084 (providing the courts that determine custody as 
opposed to the courts that do not).  See also Shapiro, supra note 126, at 494 (elaborating on the 
second approach courts used to determine the reasonableness of the search, and how it was 
irrelevant to the determination of custody). 
131 See Shapiro, supra note 126, at 491 (stating that the difference between the two 
approaches was significant because of the resulting effects on Fifth Amendment privilege). 
132 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Fifth Amendment at Justice:  A Reply, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 950, 
952 (1987) (reasoning that the Fifth Amendment “provides more protection in custodial 
interrogation than elsewhere”).  In noncustodial interviews, or stop and frisk, the suspect 
may assert the Fifth Amendment to prevent further questioning and simply walk away.  Id. 
at 952–53. 
133 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).  It is most likely that Terry did not change police 
procedure all that much, since they were already “conducting preventive stops and frisks 
long before that decision.”  Christopher Slobogin, Let’s not Bury Terry:  A Call for Rejuvenation 
of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1095 (1998).  The decision only gave 
a rationale to keep performing the stop and frisk procedures.  Id. 
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themselves or others, they may stop and frisk.134  The Court lowered the 
required standard—probable cause—based on the idea that a pat-down is 
less invasive than a full search.135  The Court used a balancing test and 
explained that “the loss of individual liberty was not too great, since [the 
officer was allowed only] a brief stop and a limited, pat-down search of 
the outer clothing to find weapons.”136  Therefore, according to Terry, the 
new standard was whether there was “reasonable suspicion that criminal 
activity was afoot.”137 
In Terry, Justice White wrote the concurring opinion in which he 
stated that a suspect was “not obliged to answer [police questions], 
answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis 
for an arrest.”138  Hiibel is the most recent notable case in which the 
reasonableness of the Terry stop has been changed.139  In Hiibel, Justice 
Stevens opined in his dissent that the Fifth Amendment right was broad 
enough to include a right to refuse even to state your own name.140  The 
majority in Hiibel held that it was not yet necessary to decide whether 
answering the question “What is your name?” to an officer is giving 
                                                 
134 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.  See Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 407, 431 (2006) (explaining that the Terry decision was very limited).  The only 
issue for review was whether the officer could frisk the men for weapons after observing 
suspicious behavior.  Id. at 431–32.  The Court did not express an opinion as to what the 
officer would have been able to do if the men had said they were looking for gifts for their 
wives.  Id. at 432.  Terry only allowed police to frisk a suspect they reasonably believed was 
a harm to them or anyone else’s safety.  Id. at 431–32. 
135 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 25–26 (finding that searching for weapons without probable cause 
must “be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation”). 
136 David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion:  When Black and Poor Means Stopped and 
Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 660 (1994).  It is arguable that what seemed like a small infringement 
has grown into something more.  Id.  Harris articulated that many Americans were now 
stopped for doing nothing.  Id. at 659 (citing Gregory H. Williams, The Supreme Court and 
Broken Promises:  The Gradual but Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 HOW. L.J. 567 (1991)). 
137 Id. at 659–60.  Rather than the standard of probable cause, a stop and frisk could now 
require only “‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the intrusion.”  Id. at 662. 
138 Terry, 392 U.S. at 34; The Supreme Court—Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 248, 289–90 
(2004). 
139 See Harris, supra note 136, at 660 (explaining that a substantial part of the law has been 
changed to provide officers with the authority to stop and frisk on two factors:  mere 
presence in a high crime area and moving away from the police). 
140 See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 192 (2004) (“[T]he Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee that ‘[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself,’ is not as circumscribed as the Court suggests, and does not admit 
even of the narrow exception defined by the Nevada statute.”).  “Under the Nevada law, a 
member of the targeted class ‘may not be compelled to answer’ any inquiry except a 
command that he ‘identify himself.’  Refusal to identify oneself upon request is punishable 
as a crime.”  Id. 
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incriminating evidence.141  Therefore, the Court determined that it was not 
a violation of the Fifth Amendment to have a law that demands suspects 
give their name to an officer.142 
The decision in Hiibel allowed police officers to demand a person’s 
name upon interrogation by the police.143  During the oral argument in 
Hiibel, the State argued that there is not actually a limitation related to the 
answers of a police interrogation.144  Since the stop in Terry was held to be 
constitutional, the Court held in Hiibel that the Miranda holding did not 
include a suspect’s right to deny a police officer his identification upon 
request.145  This case, along with Salinas, deprived citizens of part of their 
Fifth Amendment right.146  Other decisions have broadened the scope of 
Terry, expanding reasonableness factors to include searches and seizures 
based on location and behavior.147 
                                                 
141 See id. at 190–91 (discussing the implications of disclosing one’s identity as 
incriminating or not). 
142 See id. at 190 (finding that the defendant had no fear that identifying himself would be 
incriminating).  “While we recognize petitioner’s strong belief that he should not have to 
disclose his identity, the Fifth Amendment does not override the Nevada Legislature’s 
judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the disclosure would tend to 
incriminate him.”  Id. at 190–91.  “Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment 
privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand.”  Id. at 191.  If a case were to 
arise “where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop 
would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual 
of a separate offense[, i]n that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege 
applies.”  Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 191.  The Court would then decide if the Fifth Amendment had 
been violated, and what remedy it would make.  Id.  However, it does not need to resolve 
those questions here.  Id. 
143 See id. at 190 (deciding that the defendant refused to identify himself to the officers just 
because he thought it was none of their business to know his name, not out of fear of self-
incrimination).  See also M. Christine Klein, A Bird Called Hiibel:  The Criminalization of Silence, 
2003–2004 CATO S. CT. REV. 357, 361 (2003–2004) (analyzing the decision in Hiibel will be 
interpreted as opening the flood gate for officers to demand more than a person’s name). 
144 See Klein, supra note 143, at 361 (providing background to the oral argument at the 
Court hearing); Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of 
Nev., 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5553), 2004 WL 72099 (argument of Sri Srinivasan), 
available at 2004 WL 72099 (providing the response that there is likely no limitation in regards 
to answering questions). 
145 See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 192 (explaining the principle that police have the authority to 
request citizens to answer questions related to unsolved crimes). 
146 See Klein, supra note 143, at 361 (arguing that it is only a matter of time before “one of 
the many state statutes that provide broader authority for police to compel responses winds 
its way to the Supreme Court”).  It will soon be that an officer will be able to demand more 
than the mere name of a suspect, and a response must be provided.  Id. 
147 See infra Part II.C.2 (explaining the new factors that officers use in determining 
reasonableness of a Terry stop). 
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2. The New Factors:  Crime Prone Area and Evasive Behavior 
The new factors for stopping an individual are:  (1) being present in 
an area of high crime activity; and (2) evasive behavior.148  The cases that 
led to these factors are known as “location plus evasion” cases.149  Location 
alone has been held to be insufficient, however, when coupled with 
evasion, courts have found that the combination of these two factors is 
sufficient to stop and frisk.150  Unfortunately, the shift from reasonable 
suspicion to crime areas and police evasion has led to the result of a 
disproportionate number of stop and frisks to inner city, primarily poor, 
African Americans and Hispanic Americans.151  Some likely reasons for 
the lack of knowledge regarding how one would expressly invoke 
privilege are poverty and limited or no access to basic education, which 
are present in inner-city neighborhoods.152 
                                                 
148 See Harris, supra note 136, at 660 (discussing that cases stemming from Terry have 
generally required less evidence to perform a stop and frisk).  Harris further explains that 
many courts find reasonable suspicion with the combination of being involved in a high 
crime location and moving away from officers.  Id. 
149 See Harris, supra note 136, at 660, 674–75 n.139 (citing to cases throughout the Note that 
hold when both location and evasion are present, which is enough for reasonable suspicion 
and providing cases in which the Court has found location plus evasion equal to reasonable 
suspicion).  The cases are as follows:  State v. Jones, 450 So.2d 692, 694–95 (La. Ct. App. 1984) 
(presence in a high crime area at night and “walking briskly away from the scene” when the 
police approached was sufficient to amount to reasonable suspicion), rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 456 So.2d 162 (La. 1984); State v. Belton, 441 So.2d 1195 (La. 1983) (reasonable 
suspicion existed to stop a defendant who fled when the police approached a bar where 
narcotics were sold), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953 (1984); State v. Williams, 416 So. 2d 91 (La. 1982) 
(leaving the location upon seeing the police in a high crime area amounts to reasonable 
suspicion); State v. Wade, 390 So.2d 1309, 1311-12 (La. 1980) (the defendant’s presence in a 
high crime area plus flight upon observing the police amounted to reasonable suspicion); 
State v. Taylor, 363 So.2d 699, 703 (La. 1978) (presence in a high crime area plus change in 
speed of movement amounted to reasonable suspicion); State v. Stinnett, 760 P.2d 124, 127 
(Nev. 1988) (the defendant’s presence in a group of men “huddled” in a drug area and his 
running away upon seeing a police car were sufficient to support reasonable suspicion for 
the stop).  Id. 
150 See id. at 672–75, 672 n.133 (detailing the Court’s findings in cases that have a high crime 
location alone, and then cases which have the location and evasion and providing these 
cases:  “Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (holding that an individual’s presence in a high 
crime area, such as a narcotics trafficking area, is insufficient to support reasonable 
suspicion); . . . Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968) (associating with known drug 
addicts was not sufficient for a stop and frisk)”). 
151 See Harris, supra note 136, at 677 (describing the resulting effects of Terry stops in inner 
city neighborhoods to be concentrated in primarily low income, African and Hispanic 
Americans). 
152 See Christopher Totten, Criminal Law Commentary Salinas v Texas:  Guilt by Silence and 
the Disappearing Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 49 No. 6 CRIM. LAW 
BULLETIN 1501, 1509 (2013) (indicating that the poor or minorities will most likely be 
affected).  The following discusses how to invoke the privilege:   
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Critics of Terry predicted that the Court was “taking its first step 
toward the slow erosion of Fourth Amendment rights.”153  Justice Douglas 
wrote in his dissent that police would be able to pick up a suspect 
“whenever they do not like the cut of his jib . . . .”154  As a result, in New 
York alone, hundreds of thousands of innocent people are stopped and 
frisked each year by the police as they implement Terry.155  This may have 
a negative impact on racial minorities who are generally seen by police 
officers as dangerous, violent, and criminals.156 
As such, the evasion of the police happens for many reasons.157  The 
evasion typically comes from avoidance of “harassment, baseless stop and 
frisks, and even more extreme actions, such as beatings, at the hands of 
police.”158  Statistically, the criminal justice system treats minorities 
differently.159  Terry stops are more likely to occur in areas where the 
                                                 
Perhaps some of the lack of knowledge regarding how to invoke the 
privilege in the aftermath of Salinas will stem from macro-level sources 
such as poverty and limited or no access to a basic education; however, 
its source may just as likely lie in the popularization of the Miranda 
rights or the difficulty, even for those Americans who are well-educated, 
of mastering the complexities of constitutional criminal procedure law. 
Id.  See also WRIGHTSMAN & PITMAN, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining how television dramas 
have influenced the increased knowledge of the Fifth Amendment and the Miranda 
warning). 
153 See Hutchins, supra note 123, at 885 (illustrating the warnings by critics of the Terry 
doctrine). 
154 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  See Hutchins, supra note 
123, at 885 (analyzing Douglas’ statement to mean that the police may harass without any 
limitations “the less favored, the less fortunate, and the less protected”). 
155 See Hutchins, supra note 123, at 907 (explaining that a certain percentage of Terry stops 
are done without any reasonable suspicion).  See also Joseph Goldstein, Trial to Start in Class 
Suit on Stop-and-Frisk Tactic, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 2013, at A15 (providing that in New York, 
the actual recorded stops by police since 2004, eighty-eight percent of the citizens involved 
were released without arrest). 
156 See Hutchins, supra note 123, at 908 (articulating that Historian Michael Klarman 
suggested a negative impact on African Americans in the criminal justice system based on 
the decisions of the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure cases because of the façade they 
provide to a racially corrupt process).  Studies have shown that an officer bases his decision 
to stop a person on his perception of the individual as “disrespectful toward the police.”  Id. 
at 901.  Officers are in a “cultural atmosphere where stereotypes of young black men . . . are 
prevalent.”  Id. at 902.  Bias against African Americans has been documented as well.  Id.  
One such stereotype is that African American neighborhoods are more readily seen as 
chaotic and in turmoil than comparable white neighborhoods.  Id. 
157 See Harris, supra note 136, at 679 (providing a list of reasons in avoidance of the police). 
158 See id. at 679–80 (stating that the disparate treatment of minorities is no doubt the reason 
for evasion from police). 
159 See id. at 679 (explaining that the disparate treatment of African American and Hispanic 
American individuals has been proven through the overrepresentation of African Americans 
in the population in prisons and jails, the likelihood of African Americans to be stopped and 
frisked, and the beatings at the hands of law enforcement officers).  See also Hutchins, supra 
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education and poverty level are below the average standard.160  More 
African Americans and Hispanics are likely to find themselves in such 
areas deemed as high crime areas, therefore making their neighborhood 
suspect.161  Out of fear of being harassed or worse, beaten, many African 
Americans choose to avoid the police, especially in more recent months 
due to high profile cases.162  Unfortunately, in those high crime areas, the 
residents avoid police for fear of being treated like a criminal.163 
The intention of the Fifth Amendment was the protection of citizen’s 
rights.164  The Miranda warning was designed to help further that 
protection during in-custody interrogations or trial.165  The Court 
provided provisions in Miranda that a suspect must expressly invoke the 
right to remain silent to protect that same right.166  Salinas used those 
narrow holdings provided by the Court in Murphy, Griffin, Roberts, and 
Berghuis to decide that Mr. Salinas’ rights were not violated because he 
                                                 
note 123, at 902 (providing statistics that the New York City Police Department stopped more 
than 700,000 people in 2012, and the vast majority (almost eighty-five percent) “were young 
black or Latino men”). 
160 See Harris, supra note 136, at 677 (articulating that the areas where the high crime and 
high levels of drug activity were located are not evenly distributed in the urban areas in 
America).  “The unfortunate fact is that Terry and its progeny have resulted in stops and 
frisks of residents of inner cities—primarily poor persons, African Americans, and Hispanic 
Americans—far out of proportion to their numbers, and often without justification.”  Id. 
161 See id. at 680 (comparing the disproportionate value of minorities living in the poorer 
high crime areas because they live and work there). 
162 See id. at 681 (explaining that the fear of police leads to evasive behavior by minorities 
in their own neighborhoods).  The combination of the two is enough to survive a 
constitutional challenge to a Terry stop.  Id. at 686.  Charles Bradley, a middle-aged African 
American security guard was in the Bronx in front of his fiancée’s apartment building.  See 
Hutchins, supra note 123, at 904 (explaining a situation in which a man of color was a target 
of an abusive stop and frisk).  His fiancée, who is deaf in one ear, did not respond when 
Bradley rang the bell.  Id.  As Bradley was waiting on the sidewalk, an officer approached 
him.  Id.  The officer frisked Bradley, finding only a cell phone, keys, and a wallet.  Id.  
Regardless of a fruitless search, the officer arrested Bradley for trespass.  Id.  At the police 
precinct, Bradley was strip searched and instructed to appear in criminal court several 
months later.  Id.  The officer explained that he approached Bradley because he thought 
Bradley was engaged in suspicious behavior.  Hutchins, supra note 123, at 904. 
163 See Harris, supra note 136, at 679 (“Even stops and frisks that do not result in charges 
carry a cost, however, albeit one that remains largely invisible:  Large numbers of people are 
searched and seized, and treated like criminals, when they do not deserve to be.”).  “Many 
African-American males can recount an instance in which police stopped and questioned 
them or someone they knew for no reason, even physically abusing or degrading them in 
the process.”  Id. at 680. 
164 See supra Part II.A (explaining that the Constitution gives people, not just citizens, the 
right against self-incrimination in a criminal case). 
165 See supra Part II.A.1 (illustrating the inception of the Miranda warning and the 
safeguards created for custodial suspects). 
166 See supra Part II.A.2 (elaborating on how the Court has held even narrower holdings 
regarding Miranda). 
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could have expressly invoked them, rather than remain silent.167  As such, 
it was not a violation for the prosecutor to comment on that silence during 
the trial.168  As a result, Salinas will infringe further on people’s rights 
during Terry stops by exploiting the already unfavorable realities behind 
the stop and frisk.169 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The Court created a problem when it decided in Salinas that silence 
may be used against a criminal defendant at trial.170  First, Part III.A 
discusses the problem with implementing Salinas during Terry stops.171  
Second, Part III.B evaluates how Salinas narrows the Fifth Amendment 
privilege.172  Third, Part III.C explores the mistrust formed between the 
police and citizens in minority and lower socio-economic status 
neighborhoods.173  Fourth, Part III.D explains why the Miranda warning is 
no longer effective.174  Finally, Part III.E analyzes the result that Miranda 
does not protect suspects before interrogation, including Terry stops.175 
                                                 
167 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (examining the holding of these cases 
in determining that Salinas did not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege by remaining 
mute); supra note 13 (providing the holdings of these cases).  See also Charles D. Weisselberg, 
DNA, Dogs, the Nickel, and Other Curiosities:  Criminal Law Cases in the Supreme Court’s 2012–
2013 Term, 49 COURT REV. 178, 182 (2013) (discussing how any rule contrary to Berghuis v. 
Thompkins would be hard for the Salinas’ Court to reconcile). 
168 See supra Part II.B (explaining the Salinas case and the implications of its holding). 
169  See Vivian Deborah Wilson, Shifting Burdens in Criminal Law:  A Burden on Due Process, 
8 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 731, 732 (1981) (discussing burden shifting); supra Part II.D (giving 
a brief overview of Terry, defining reasonable suspicion, narrowing Terry stops, and finally 
explaining the new factors for a stop and frisk).  See also Richard F. Albert, The Supreme Court’s 
Decision in Salinas v. Texas:  Implications for White Collar Investigation, FORBES (June 19, 2003), 
http://onforb.es/17mOnJT [http://perma.cc/QP6V-9VJQ] (explaining the implications of 
remaining silent during an interrogation, despite the intentions of the suspect).  “[I]f the 
witness does not expressly refer to the Fifth Amendment the government would appear to 
be free to argue at a later trial that refusal to answer the questions was an indication of guilt.”  
Id. 
170 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178. 
171 See infra Part III.A (elaborating on how the Fifth Amendment as a right to remain silent 
is almost a misnomer after Salinas). 
172 See infra Part III.B (analyzing how Salinas narrowed the Fifth Amendment rights for 
citizens). 
173 See infra Part III.C (explaining the mistrust and fears generated within neighborhoods 
against the police). 
174 See infra Part III.D (analyzing the understanding of the Fifth Amendment privilege and 
the usefulness of the Miranda warning). 
175 See infra Part III.E (discussing the need for new verbiage for a better understanding of a 
suspect’s rights). 
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A. The Problems with Salinas 
The Court in Salinas intended to allow officers to conduct 
investigations without fear of their discoveries being inadmissible in 
court.176  Although the Court’s decision accomplished this, it also led to 
consequences the Court may not have intended.177  The problem with 
imposing this newly-held idea is that the right protected by the Fifth 
Amendment is now incomprehensible to the people it is meant to 
protect.178  To avoid having one’s silence used against him at trial, the 
privilege against self-incrimination must be asserted. 179  During a police 
investigation, a majority of suspects do not know to expressly invoke the 
Fifth Amendment privilege, but in reality, very few people have the 
courage or education to expressly “assert their . . . rights in the face of 
authority[.]”180 
Salinas encourages police to actively violate the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment.181  Once a suspect is in an interrogation setting, he may 
                                                 
176 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2181 (2013) (stating that the exception “needlessly 
burden[s] the Government’s interests in obtaining testimony and prosecuting criminal 
activity” to allow a suspect to remain mute during an interrogation). 
177 See infra Part III.A (explaining that the protections will be harder to be implemented by 
suspects because they are unaware that they must expressly invoke their Fifth Amendment 
right). 
178 See Ollivierre, supra note 100, at 591 (explaining the implications of Salinas).  But see 
Eugene R. Milhizer, Rethinking Police Interrogation:  Encouraging Reliable Confessions While 
Respecting Suspects’ Dignity, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2006) (stating that the words included 
in the Miranda warning are wrong because the inculpatory statements may be used against 
a suspect at trial, and more importantly, exculpatory statements benefiting the suspect are 
more likely to be used eliminating the need for a trial). 
179 See Totten, supra note 152, at 1522–23 (expounding on the dangers of remaining silent 
during police questioning).  The silence in the context of the questioning might not be 
indicative of the person’s guilt.  Id. at 1508–09.  It is then possible that juries will overvalue 
the significance of that silence and vote guilty.  Id. at 1509. 
180 See Harris, supra note 136, at 674 n.138.  Harris states: 
Perhaps one of the most troubling issue[s] from the plurality’s opinion 
in Salinas is that most police suspects subjected to non-custodial police 
interrogation, regardless of whether they are actually guilty of the 
suspected crime, will most likely not know to expressly invoke the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in order to attempt to 
prevent their silence from being used against them as evidence of guilt 
at a future trial. 
Totten, supra note 152, at 1508. (internal citations omitted).  One uncomfortable look or, 
heaven forbid, remaining silent, can be interpreted to mean guilt.  See Garrett, supra note 74, 
at 124 (speculating that Salinas could actually make communities more fearful of police). 
181 See Murphy, supra note 13, at 201 (explaining the implications of Salinas on suspects).  
The following discusses the implications on the public after Salinas:   
After Salinas, savvy law enforcement officers may be more inclined to 
track suspects in public and confront them with accusatory questions.  
Police officers and detectives may now spring incriminating (“gotcha”) 
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falsely believe that he has the right to remain silent.182  The constitutional 
right to remain silent is not invoked or provided for without the suspect 
giving voice to his intent to invoke his privilege.183  However, the plurality 
in Salinas failed to address what is sufficient to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment.184  This failure poses a problem for those suspects who are 
not able to obtain counsel without the help of the court.185  If the suspect 
remains silent, without expressly invoking the privilege, regardless of his 
intent for that silence to be exculpatory, it could still be used against him 
during a trial.186  The implications can subject the suspect to self-
accusation, perjury, or contempt.187  The Court did not indicate particular 
wording that would be sufficient to indicate invocation, rather an idea of 
express invocation, without definition.188  In other words, the Court never 
came out and said what is required; therefore, people do not know.189  
There may be some who know to say, “I expressly invoke my right to 
remain silent,” but also others who would only utter, “Don’t talk to me.”190  
This is why the need for officers to carry the pre-arrest statement is so 
great.191 
                                                 
questions on suspects throughout an interview and record any non-
verbal tells, pauses, or silences, all of which can be used at trial as 
evidence of guilt. 
Id. 
182 See Ryan, supra note 22, at 917 (finding there is a popular belief that remaining silent is 
a right and protects against self-incrimination). 
183 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2181 (2013) (“[A] defendant normally does not 
invoke the privilege by remaining silent.”). 
184 Id.  See Ollivierre, supra note 100, at 594 (stating that ignorance of the law is no excuse). 
185 See Ollivierre, supra note 100, at 591 (articulating that suspects are more likely to 
implicate themselves in a crime they did not commit).  The decision also gives prosecutors 
leverage in the plea bargaining process.  Id. at 592. 
186 See Ryan, supra note 22, at 917 (explaining that the suspect may have a belief that he has 
the right to remain silent without having been read his Miranda warnings and could be 
intending the silence to be exculpatory). 
187 See Ollivierre, supra note 100, at 591 (illustrating that defendants may implicate 
themselves by merely trying to be compliant without an alternative option to remaining 
silent). 
188 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2179 (explaining that an express invocation requirement allows 
officers to know the reasoning behind the silence).  The Court did not clarify what constitutes 
express invocation.  Id.  However, the plurality did say that the suspect is the only one who 
can know if a question is self-incriminating.  Id. at 2182. 
189 See Green, supra note 107, at 407 (indicating that possibly the next issue for courts to 
address is “whether a person’s choice of words, meant to invoke his right to remain silent, 
are sufficient to meet the Supreme Court’s requirement of ‘express invocation’”). 
190 Id. at 407.  The suspects must then play “word games” to meet the holding in Salinas.  
Id. at 407–08. 
191 See Schultz, supra note 25, at 165 (discussing the Miranda card that officers carry, to have 
on hand, the language needed to protect suspects in custody against a violation of their Fifth 
Amendment rights).  See also infra Part IV (indicating that officers would carry pre-arrest 
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The Salinas decision will achieve the opposite of what the plurality 
claimed as its interest.192  It stands to obstruct obtaining testimony and 
prosecuting criminals.193  Salinas provides officers engaged in non-
custodial interrogation with authority to use a suspect’s silence as 
evidence of guilt.194  This might compel suspects to speak only so that the 
silence is not misinterpreted.195  Ironically, the plurality held its interest to 
be of utmost importance, but it failed to see that its repercussions would 
contrast with its interest.196 
B. Salinas Narrows the Fifth Amendment Privilege by Using Silence as 
Incrimination 
The Court in Salinas extended the Fifth Amendment standard that was 
created in Berghuis to allow a suspect’s silence to be used if it comes before 
the Miranda warning.197  If a suspect remains silent, the prosecution may 
use that silence in his trial to imply guilt.198  This implication creates an 
                                                 
cards similar to those carried by officers for the Miranda warning and read the statement to 
suspects not in custody before interrogation). 
192 See Ollivierre, supra note 100, at 591 (explaining that the plurality holding will most 
likely not help the government gain testimony nor will it further the support of prosecuting 
criminals); Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2181 (emphasizing the government’s interest in gaining 
testimony and prosecuting crime). 
193 See Ollivierre, supra note 100, at 586 (illustrating that the plurality emphasized that the 
government’s interest in securing testimony and prosecuting crime makes it vital that the 
government “knows that the witness is fearful of self-incrimination”).  The use of silence in 
Salinas as proof of guilt gives witnesses to crimes and suspects, similar to Salinas, qualms 
about cooperating with police because they are afraid to be tricked or deceived.  Id. at 596. 
194 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180. 
195 See id. at 2186 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (arguing that if the prosecution is allowed to 
comment on the silence, the defendant might feel compelled to take the stand to explain that 
silence). 
196 See Ollivierre, supra note 100, at 596 (explaining that it is taboo to cooperate with the 
police in many high crime areas, and the holding in Salinas does nothing to help that fear of 
trickery or abuse). 
197 See Holland, supra note 83 (discussing that the Texas Court found that pre-arrest silence 
was not protected under the Constitution).  The dissent in Salinas found that Salinas must 
either answer questions or remain silent, but if he answered, he could have incriminated 
himself or revealed “prejudicial facts, disreputable associates, or suspicious circumstances—
even if he is innocent.”  Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  “To permit a 
prosecutor to comment on a defendant’s constitutionally protected silence would put that 
defendant in an impossible predicament.  He must either answer the question or remain 
silent.”  Id. 
198 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The following discusses the 
significance of allowing comments on silence:   
If he remains silent, the prosecutor may well use that silence to suggest 
a consciousness of guilt.  And if the defendant then takes the witness 
stand in order to explain either his speech or his silence, the prosecution 
may introduce, say for impeachment purposes, a prior conviction that 
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undue burden for a defendant, one in which he must attempt to overcome 
pre-arrest statements or possible incriminating silences and actions at 
trial.199  This is a direct infringement of the Fifth Amendment.200  The 
protection provided for is the right against self-incrimination, and when 
the Court allows silence to be used as incrimination, that protection is 
stripped from the person.201 
The plurality’s reasoning behind Salinas indicated Salinas had no right 
to remain silent because he did not expressly invoke the privilege.202  
Therefore, he would have needed to explicitly state his intent to rely on 
the Fifth Amendment, which he failed to do when he remained silent.203  
The Court has held that the prosecution may not comment on a suspect’s 
silence after the Miranda warning is given in a custodial interrogation, 
                                                 
the law would otherwise make inadmissible.  Thus, where the Fifth 
Amendment is at issue, to allow comment on silence directly or 
indirectly can compel an individual to act as “a witness against 
himself”—very much what the Fifth Amendment forbids. 
Id. 
199 See Murphy, supra note 13, at 185 (detailing the implications pre-arrest statements have 
and the mountains defendants must climb to right the wrongs they committed during those 
statements).  This burden is what Genovevo Salinas had to overcome at his trial.  Salinas, 133 
S. Ct. at 2180.  The Court explained that it would have been simple for him to just tell the 
officers that he was not answering the questions because of his Fifth Amendment rights.  Id. 
at 2191.  However, since he did not, the use of his silence at trial did not violate his 
constitutional right.  Id. at 2180. 
200 See supra Part II.A (explaining the language of the Fifth Amendment and its 
protections). 
201 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (elaborating on the right not to be “compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself”); Green, supra note 107, at 406–07 (explaining the 
justification of Justice Breyer).  Justice Breyer argued further that Salinas was “punished both 
by his silence and his spoken words.”  Green, supra note 107, at 406–07.  When the Court 
allows the prosecution to comment on silence, either directly or indirectly, it is compelling 
the suspect to act as a witness against himself, which is precisely what the Fifth Amendment 
is protecting.  Id. at 407.  Breyer also noted that precedent held “no ritualistic formula [was] 
necessary in order to invoke the privilege . . . .”  Id.  The dissent formed a test that asked if:  
“one [can] fairly infer from an individual’s silence and surrounding circumstances an 
exercise of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege?  If the answer to this question is ‘yes,’ then ‘the 
Fifth Amendment prohibits the Prosecutor from commenting on [defendant’s] silence.’”  
Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2191.  See Totten, supra note 152, at 1510 n.45 (explaining that the dissent 
found the circumstances were such that Salinas was told he was a suspect, the interrogation 
happened at the police station, and he did not have an attorney; “those factors give rise to a 
reasonable inference”).  See also Green, supra note 107, at 407 (providing that analysis of the 
Fifth Amendment takes into account for the fact that the Court has consistently held no 
special words or formula is required to invoke privilege). 
202 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178–79, 2184 (providing the reasoning for which the Court held 
that Salinas’ argument failed). 
203 See Ollivierre, supra note 100, at 580 (providing a suspect’s right to remain silent is 
available only if he is in a custodial interrogation, which Salinas was not). 
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even to impeach him.204  Salinas’ situation differs from the normal 
standards of Miranda because the Miranda factors were not met; he was 
neither given the Miranda warning, nor was he in a custodial 
interrogation.205  Since the Court failed to explain what happens if a 
defendant, like Salinas, remains silent prior to being given the Miranda 
warning, his silence actually could be used against him as evidence of his 
guilt.206 
The problem with not knowing to expressly invoke the privilege is 
that a prosecutor can point out the defendant’s silence at trial.207  This, in 
turn, will give an unjust advantage to the prosecution, eliminating the 
need for it to prove all the elements of its case.208  The defendant would 
effectively be forced to prove his innocence rather than the prosecution 
proving all the issues.209  The most offensive infringement of the Fifth 
                                                 
204 See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (stating that it would be unfair to use silence).  
Justice Powell delivered the opinion, expressing that:   
[W]hile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance 
that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any 
person who receives the warnings.  In such circumstances, it would be 
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the 
arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation 
subsequently offered at trial. 
Id.  See Donovan, supra note 96, at 219 (giving a brief synopsis of the law on Miranda 
warnings).  The prosecution is not allowed to comment in any way during the trial if the 
defendant fails to testify.  Id.  The prosecution may use the silence to impeach the defendant, 
if he does take the stand, so long as the silence occurred before the Miranda warning.  Id.  The 
prosecution may not use post-Miranda silence, even to impeach.  Id.  See Salinas, 133. S. Ct. at 
2182 (using the holding in Berghuis to determine that if a two hour and forty-five minute 
silence in that case were not enough to invoke the privilege, Salinas’ momentary silence 
surely was not enough either). 
205 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2177 (providing that Salinas was neither placed in custody, nor 
was he given Miranda warnings). 
206 See Ryan, supra note 22, at 903 (analyzing pre-Miranda silence in 2007, before the Salinas 
case). 
207 See Stephen E. Smith, Defendant Silence and Rhetorical Stasis, 46 CONN. L. REV. ONLINE 19, 
21 (2013) (explaining how the advantage a defendant has, by not having to prove his 
innocence, is jeopardized through the use of silence in eliminating the need for the 
government to prove all the elements of his case). 
208 See id. at 25 (explaining that jurors were allowed to infer that silence indicated an 
affirmative response).  In a criminal trial, the person charged with the crime is not required 
to prove he did not commit the crime.  See Wilson, supra note 169, at 731–32 (discussing the 
burden of proof and when it shifts to the defendant in a criminal case).  “The accused stands 
innocent until he is proven guilty.”  Id. at 732.  The prosecution must meet an onerous 
burden, proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.  If the prosecution proves all of the 
elements of the crime, then the burden shifts to the defendant to raise a doubt of one element 
of the crime.  Id. at 774. 
209 Id. at 774–75.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 
(2013) (No. 12-246) (providing the dialogue between Jeffrey Fisher, Stanford Law Supreme 
Court Clinic, and the Court on behalf of Mr. Salinas).  Jeffrey Fisher argued for Mr. Salinas 
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Amendment happens when the burden shifts to the defendant.210  A 
criminal defendant remains protected under the Fifth Amendment from 
being forced to take the stand at a criminal trial and from being compelled 
to be a witness against himself.211  However, after the burden has shifted, 
as a result of Salinas, he must now defend himself, and rather than the state 
having the burden to prove its case, the defendant must disprove it.212 
C. Mistrust 
In high crime areas, there is already a lack of cooperation between 
citizens and the police due to the lack of trust.213  The use of silence as 
evidence further creates a divide between the two sides.214  Members of 
the community will be more fearful of cooperating with the police if “an 
uncomfortable look or gesture or silence [may] be interpreted as a guilty 
                                                 
during the appeal.  Id.  Mr. Fisher advocated that “[t]he Fifth Amendment prohibits using a 
person’s silence during a non[-]custodial police interview against him at trial . . . .”  Id.  Mr. 
Fisher indicated that if that were not the case, the “burden of proof would be unjustly shifted 
to [Mr.] Salinas.”  Id.  Justice Ginsburg asked in reply if Berghuis would apply because Mr. 
Salinas did not invoke his right to silence.  Id. at 4.  Mr. Fisher accepted that if Mr. Salinas’ 
conduct was communicative, then it could be commented upon.  Id. at 8–9.  See also Gee, supra 
note 115, at 741 (explaining the argument on behalf of Mr. Salinas, as well as the questions 
posed by the Court). 
210 See Wilson, supra note 169, at 774 (illustrating that when the prosecution meets its 
burden, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to defend himself).  In a criminal defense 
case, the defendant should never be coerced into testifying.  See id. at 745–46 (indicating that 
there would be an abuse against self-incrimination). 
211 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no person should be compelled to testify against 
himself in a criminal trial). 
212 See Wilson, supra note 169, at 774–75 (providing the procedural explanation of burden 
shifting). 
213 See Ollivierre, supra note 100, at 596 (explaining that cooperation with police officers is 
already unlikely in high-crime neighborhoods because many of the residents feel that the 
police cannot be trusted); Hutchins, supra note 123, at 884 (describing that Terry stops are so 
pervasive that people believe the police are allowed to stop anyone for any reason).  Officers 
have been trained to be suspicious, more than an average American.  See Hutchins, supra 
note 123, at 901 (indicating that officers are trained specially to be suspicious).  An officer 
might see the activity of an African American youth as more suspicious than the same 
activity performed by a white youth.  Id. at 902.  See also Harris, supra note 136, at 659–660 
(explaining the minority’s view of police following episodes of unwarranted stop and frisk, 
including instances of police brutality). 
214 See Ollivierre, supra note 100, at 596 (indicating that because of the use of silence as an 
indicator of guilt is granted by the Court, “witnesses to crime and suspects like Salinas may 
hesitate to cooperate with the police for fear of being deceived by them”). 
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gesture or an incriminating silence.”215  That fear will further impede the 
government from gaining testimony.216 
Typically a stop and frisk means that the officer may ask the suspect 
questions to obtain identity and dispel the officer’s suspicions, but the 
suspect is not obligated to respond.217  However, the Salinas, along with 
the Hiibel holding now change that obligation.218  Unfortunately, African 
Americans have a fear of responding to the police during Terry stops.219  
Despite their legitimate fear that responding to the police will lead to 
mistreatment, the opinion of many non-minority Americans is that the 
only reason to avoid the police is out of guilt.220  Salinas supports this idea 
by assuming that suspects remain silent to provide time to think of a good 
lie, rather than just out of sheer mistrust.221  The residents in those high 
crime neighborhoods are most in need of police protection and are now 
fearful of the police.222 
                                                 
215 See Garrett, supra note 74, at 124 (explaining a growing mistrust of law enforcement).  
See also Susskind, supra note 12, at 332 (discussing reasonable suspicion and race).  The 
totality of the circumstances is what is used to determine reasonableness in a Terry stop.  Id.  
However, the “indeterminate nature of the standard” makes it very easy for a police officer 
to justify the reasons for the stop, when it was actually for no reason at all.  Id.  Courts are 
also deferential towards the law enforcement, thereby allowing officers to use race as a factor 
without actually saying so.  Id. 
216 See Harris, supra note 136, at 679 (stating that people have other reasons to fear the police 
besides guilt).  African Americans are frequent targets of abuse by police.  Id. at 679–80.  
Therefore, they are more likely to avoid interactions with the police.  Id.  They want to “avoid 
harassment, baseless stops and frisks, and even more extreme actions, such as beatings, at 
the hands of police.”  Id. at 680.  As such, one would think they would remain silent out of 
fear.  See id. (explaining how minority suspects want to avoid ill treatment). 
217 See Shapiro, supra note 20, at 4 (explaining that the officer is able to ask the suspect 
questions to determine identity or information to clear the officer’s suspicions of the suspect). 
218 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (holding that in a non-custodial context, 
a suspect must expressly invoke his right to remain silent). 
219 See Harris, supra note 136, at 680 (elaborating on how many African Americans do not 
even know why they are being stopped or know others who have had the same happen).  
“African Americans, as more frequent targets of undesirable treatment by police than whites, 
are naturally more likely to want to avoid contact with the police.”  Id. 
220 See id. at 679 (explaining that the dissection of cases is a misrepresentation of all cases, 
and there are many reasons people run from the police).  “Opinions in post-Terry cases that 
include avoidance of the police create a distorted picture.  These cases convey the impression 
that only one reason exists to avoid police:  escaping apprehension for a crime.”  Id. 
221 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182.  “To be sure, someone might decline to answer a police 
officer’s question in reliance on his constitutional privilege.  But he also might do so because 
he is trying to think of a good lie . . . .”  Id.  See George E. Dix, Nonarrest Investigatory 
Detentions in Search and Seizure Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 849, 958 (1985) (“[S]uch silence should be 
inadmissible to prove guilt under Griffin and Doyle; despite the absence of warnings, it is 
highly likely that the citizen intended the silence as an exercise of the right to decline to 
answer.”). 
222 See Harris, supra note 136, at 681 (contributing that the location plus evasion stop and 
frisks treat all-black neighborhoods as if they were enemy territory to the police).  “Those 
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D. The Miranda Warning 
The Law & Order fans who have the Miranda warning memorized—
from watching Lennie Briscoe every Tuesday night for years—would be 
shocked to learn that there is no standard Miranda warning.223  Due to the 
rising popularity of television shows depicting criminal law, the Fifth 
Amendment is one of the most recognized constitutional rights.224  
Therefore Americans would never think that remaining silent could be 
proof of their guilt.225  There are simply too many versions of Miranda 
warnings.226  Some are easy to understand, while others still are more 
complicated and difficult for the average defendant to understand.227  The 
inconsistencies between jurisdictions prevent uniformity in the reading of 
the warning.228  Without a clear and concise standard reading, the 
understanding of the right becomes blurred.229 
                                                 
communities most in need of police protection may come to regard the police as a racist, 
occupying force.”  Id. 
223 See WRIGHTSMAN & PITMAN, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining how recognizable the Fifth 
Amendment right is to Americans because of mass media).  “Even [the] casual viewers of 
television recognize the term ‘Miranda Rights’ and the most inveterate watchers of crime 
shows can readily repeat [the lines].”  Id.  “To the devoted Lenny Briscoe fan (‘Law & Order’ 
character portrayed by the late Jerry Orbach), this may come as a bit of a surprise.”  Id. at 86.  
There is no standard Miranda warning.  Id.  A fifty state survey yielded 886 different written 
Miranda warnings among 945 federal, state, and county jurisdictions.  Id.  Law & Order was 
a syndicated police procedural and legal drama in which Lennie Briscoe was a police 
detective for more than twenty years.  Jerry Orbach Biography, A&E TELEVISION NETWORK, 
http://www.biography.com/people/jerry-orbach-9542264 [http://perma.cc/6DU4-B6QJ]. 
224 See Ryan, supra note 22, at 903 (asserting that Americans know that they have a right to 
remain silent).  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in Dickerson v. United States that “Miranda has 
become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become a 
part of our national culture.”  WRIGHTSMAN & PITMAN, supra note 22, at 3.  See also Leo, supra 
note 61, at 651 (explaining that this knowledge is attributed to mass media introducing the 
Miranda warning in television programming).  It is also doubtful that suspects have not ever 
heard the Miranda warning before being arrested.  Id. 
225 See Ryan, supra note 22, at 903 (contending that because the Fifth Amendment is the 
most widely known of the Bill of Rights, Americans would never even think that the use of 
their silence could be used against them to prove their guilt). 
226 See WRIGHTSMAN & PITMAN, supra note 22, at 85–90 (finding that there are too many 
Miranda warnings to obtain a full and accurate count). 
227 See id. at 87 (providing information from resources that found Miranda warnings that 
ranged from elementary level understanding through post-college). 
228 See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining how each jurisdiction can have its own Miranda warning 
and that they range in difficulty to understand). 
229 See WRIGHTSMAN & PITMAN, supra note 22, at 88 (finding that understanding the 
warning requires more than just recognition of the words).  The suspect “must be able to 
integrate the whole message and apply its meaning to their own case.”  Id. 
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Problems begin when police officers interrogate a suspect without 
first providing him with his Miranda rights.230  Police are now encouraged 
to question suspects outside of the stationhouse.231  The new standard 
operating procedure for police officers will be to question the suspects 
first, outside of custody, and arrest afterward.232  Officers will be able to 
interview or interrogate in a non-custodial context, and if the suspect does 
not know to expressly invoke his right to remain silent, the prosecution 
will be able to comment on that silence.233  In this scenario, the arrestee has 
more rights than the person not in custody.234  So, if there is nothing to 
stop officers from conducting entire investigations without an arrest, they 
will be able to use all of a defendant’s actions, conduct, silence, and 
testimony during the pre-arrest interrogations.235 
The Salinas decision draws a line in the protection of suspects based 
on custody.236  The custodial suspect has a better understanding of his 
Fifth Amendment rights because the officer reads him the Miranda 
warning, and for those suspects the Court holds a higher standard for 
waiving privilege.237  For example, the suspect in a non-custodial 
                                                 
230 See Garrett, supra note 74, at 116 (stating that the Fifth Amendment protections “eroded” 
with the Salinas holding by allowing “informal, undocumented questioning”). 
231 See id. at 128 (elaborating on how officers are taking advantage of the lack of protection 
to suspects not in custody).  The following discusses police questioning suspects:   
As a result of the Supreme Court’s tolerance of a questions-first, rights-
later approach, police have more incentives to informally question 
suspects with an eye to a confession.  The result encourages police to 
question suspects without the protections that more and more 
departments have adopted precisely to prevent false and contaminated 
confessions. 
Id.  See also Davis, supra note 103, at 16 (explaining that as a result of Salinas, the police will 
be able to interrogate before arresting a suspect and use his silence against him at trial). 
232 See Davis, supra note 103, at 16 (describing the effects of the stripping of protections 
without Miranda for pre-arrest suspects). 
233 See Weisselberg, supra note 167, at 182 (discussing how without express invocation, 
officers can comment on the silence during its case-in-chief). 
234 See Murphy, supra note 13, at 185 (explaining that the rights of the custodial suspects 
are afforded greater protections, which infringes upon the rights of the suspect that is not 
charged with a crime). 
235 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013) (allowing the prosecution to comment 
on Salinas’ silence during interrogation during the trial). 
236 See Totten, supra note 152, at 1502 (discussing the distinction put in custody in Salinas).  
“[T]he Salinas judgment also arbitrarily and unjustifiably creates a distinction between 
custodial (i.e., Mirandized) and non-custodial suspects who remain silent in response to 
police questioning—the former being much more protected under the Fifth Amendment 
privilege with respect to their silence than the latter.”  Id. at 1523. 
237 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 39, at 21 (illustrating that a suspect taken into custody must 
be warned before questioning that “he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says 
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, 
and that if he can’t afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning 
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interview is not guaranteed his privilege unless he expressly invokes it, 
but the Court has held that a custodial suspect can only waive his privilege 
knowingly.238  This infringement on a person’s constitutional right is 
biased toward the non-custodial suspect, who is not afforded a pre-arrest 
warning of his rights.239 
E. Terry Stops and Miranda Warnings 
The Court in Terry held that Miranda warnings are not necessary when 
a person is detained and questioned in a stop and frisk.240  When Miranda 
was decided in 1966, coercive police behavior that is considered 
reasonable in a Terry stop today, would have almost definitely required a 
Miranda warning.241  Today there is a circuit split whether the Miranda 
warning is required for a Terry stop based on reasonableness of the stop.242  
This split is the reason why Terry stops are used as the example for the 
non-custodial police interrogation in this Note.243  The pre-arrest 
statement that is necessary for the states to adopt will be applied to Terry 
stops, in which the suspect is not in custody, nor read his Miranda 
warning.244 
The Salinas Court relied on the holding of Berghuis that “[a] suspect 
who stands mute has not done enough to put police on notice that he is 
relying on his Fifth Amendment privileges.”245  Since a Terry stop, just as 
a non-custodial interrogation, does not require the reading of the Miranda 
                                                 
if he so desires”).  See also Totten, supra note 152, at 1523 (explaining that the custodial 
suspects are more protected under the Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to their 
silence than non-custodial). 
238 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 39, at 21 (describing that the Court has made it “clear that the 
Constitutional guarantees to silence and counsel in custodial interrogation can only be 
waived knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily”). 
239 See infra Part IV (indicating that a pre-arrest statement could alleviate this bias and 
provide uniformity to all suspects in interrogations). 
240 See Dinger, supra note 125, at 1469–70 (explaining that Miranda warnings are not 
necessary to participate in investigative detentions and not be in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, regardless of the detention’s coercive nature). 
241 See Swift, supra note 124, at 1075 (discussing that coercive behavior by the police that is 
considered reasonable in this day, would definitely not have been reasonable at the time 
Miranda was decided). 
242 See supra Part II.C.1 (providing the background to the circuit split and the reasoning the 
courts hold for finding either custody or non-custody in a Terry stop). 
243 See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining the reasonableness standard applied to determine 
custody in four circuits). 
244 See infra Part IV (providing the suggestion for a pre-arrest statement that officers would 
carry on a card, similar to the Miranda warning, and read to suspects in a non-custodial 
interrogation). 
245 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 (2013) (finding that “the logic of Berghuis 
applies with equal force”). 
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warnings, suspects will not know to expressly invoke their Fifth 
Amendment privilege.246  The Court in Salinas listened to the petitioner 
argue that “it would be unfair to require a suspect unschooled in the 
particulars of legal doctrine to . . . invoke his ‘right to remain silent.’”247  
The end result was that if the privilege is not invoked, the suspect’s silence 
may be used against him at a later date for a conviction.248 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
A pre-arrest model code should be adopted in every state to address 
the problem created by the decision in Salinas, in which the non-custodial 
suspects are not afforded a warning of their rights.  The purpose of the 
pre-arrest model code is to protect the people who are unaware of their 
rights, especially when they are being interrogated or stopped by police 
during any non-custodial stop, such as a Terry stop.  The pre-arrest model 
code will give officers clear language to inform suspects of their rights.  
The language should be presented to all persons in a non-custodial, pre-
arrest context before a Miranda warning would normally be necessary.  
The code should include language about the use of silence alone not being 
enough to properly invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege.  First, Part 
IV.A proposes a pre-arrest model code to protect suspects’ rights during 
police interrogation, including Terry stops.249  Second, Part IV.B addresses 
the advantages of a pre-arrest model code as a solution to the problem and 
Part IV.D provides counterarguments to the proposed pre-arrest model 
code.250 
A. The Proposed Language of the Model Code 
A model code that is adaptable by all states, in a clear language 
understood by all citizens, is the best remedy to ensure a suspect is aware 
                                                 
246 See id. at 2179–80 (holding that the Court did not suggest what threshold a suspect must 
cross to meet invocation of the Fifth Amendment in the eyes of the Court). 
247 Id. at 2177.  In responding to the petitioner’s argument, the court found that the:   
Fifth Amendment guarantees that no one may be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself; it does not establish an 
unqualified “right to remain silent.”  A witness’ constitutional right to 
refuse to answer questions depends on his reasons for doing so, and 
courts need to know those reasons to evaluate the merits of a Fifth 
Amendment claim. 
Id. at 2182–83.  (internal citations omitted). 
248 See id. at 2178 (holding that the use of silence was not a violation of Salinas’ 
constitutional rights). 
249 See infra Part IV.A (stating the text of the proposed model code to be used during 
interrogations of suspects). 
250 See infra Part IV.B (explaining why a model code is better than other solutions). 
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of what they must do to protect his rights.  All States should adopt the pre-
arrest model code, provided below:   
During this interrogation, you have the right to leave.  You are 
not under arrest.  You do not have to answer my questions, but 
you must state that you are choosing to invoke your Fifth 
Amendment right.  If you remain silent, without stating your 
intent to use your constitutional privilege, your silence may be 
used against you during a trial.251 
Officers would need to read this during a non-custodial interrogation, 
for example a Terry stop.  This would be printed on a card that officers 
would carry, perhaps even on the back of the Miranda warning they 
already carry.252  The pre-arrest card will be effective for maintaining 
uniform language.  The police officer will have no problem, when called 
in court, recalling what he read to a suspect because he will have the card. 
B. Commentary 
This model code is proposed, as a warning similar to Miranda, to help 
protect the non-custodial suspects who are unaware how to invoke their 
privilege.  This warning will inform suspects of their rights as non-
custodial suspects during questioning, how to invoke the privilege, and 
how their chosen silence can be used against them.  This proposed 
warning eliminates the confusion regarding the rights of the suspects.  
This language also indicates exactly what will happen if they do not state 
the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. 
An interrogation is meant to be any questioning done by police 
officers when the suspect is not in custody.  The warning will let the 
suspect know that he has a right to leave the police station or walk away 
from the situation and is not being detained for an arrest.  He will be 
afforded his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, as the Constitution 
                                                 
251 The proposed section is the contribution of the author.  The right to remain silent 
portion of the text is pulled from the Miranda warning because it is imperative that the code 
be similar to the language provided by the Court.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–
68 (1966) (finding that from the outset the person subjected to interrogation shall be informed 
in “clear and unequivocal terms” that he has the right to remain silent).  Those terms must 
also include “that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court.”  Id. at 
469.  The warning must also let the suspect know that they have the right to counsel.  Id. at 
471–72.  The suspect must also be informed that the court can appoint counsel if he cannot 
afford one.  Id. at 472.  The portion of the code that states your silence may be used against 
you during a trial is an interpretation of how Salinas would be applied to his trial.  See Salinas, 
133 S. Ct. at 2179 (claiming that because Salinas did not assert his Fifth Amendment right, 
they did not have to address the issue of silence used during his trial). 
252 See Schultz, supra note 25, at 165 (explaining that officers carry Miranda cards). 
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outlines, but will be told that to invoke that right, the suspect must 
expressly say that he chooses to use it.  The model code also warns the 
suspect of the consequences if he remains silent without an express 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege.  Finally, there are only fifty-
nine words in the model code, so that it is easily understood. 
Possible criticisms to this proposed model code include the 
procedural requirements and effectiveness of the model code.  The 
disincentives may be an issue for police during an investigation.  This code 
could potentially halt a suspect or witness from giving information he 
might have given had he not realized his rights, therefore closing the door 
to vital investigative information.  However, the preservation of citizens’ 
rights justifies the code.  The code would also better serve to protect those 
individuals who cannot afford an attorney.  This is because a public 
defender is generally assigned after the initial appearance. If a suspect 
cannot afford an attorney, he would have to go through the entire arrest 
process before he would have counsel to guide him in his decision-making 
process. 
Another challenge to this model code is that some may feel this code 
will allow criminals to be set free.  This will not be the case because the 
prosecution should have substantial evidence to meet its burden, as in 
Salinas where the prosecution had matching ballistics to his gun from the 
casings at the murder scene.  The liberty of a defendant should not be 
stripped away because of anxious behavior at the stationhouse. 
This proposal is the best way to get the states to adopt a uniform 
warning without having to rewrite Miranda or propose a constitutional 
amendment.  Creating an amendment would require two-thirds of the 
legislatures of all the states to ratify.253  Legislatures on the state level are 
in the best position to adopt this code because state legislatures should 
want to protect their citizens, and states can more easily adopt this code 
into their state legislation. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It is a misnomer to say that, “[y]ou have the right to remain silent.”  In 
reality, “[y]ou have the right to expressly invoke the right to remain 
silent.”254  Returning to the hypothetical introduced earlier where 
Genovevo Salinas voluntarily went to the police station to answer 
questions about his gun that he turned over to the police, the situation 
                                                 
253 See U.S. CONST. art. V (stating that two thirds of both Houses of Congress must propose 
amendments to the Constitution). 
254 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2179 (finding that a suspect must expressly invoke the right to 
remain silent). 
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would be significantly different applying the model code.255  If the officer 
read the pre-arrest statement to Salinas before leaving his house, 
answering any questions at the station, or remaining silent to the ballistics 
question, he would have known his options.  He would have known that 
he had the right not to answer the question, but he also would have known 
to expressly invoke his right.  Instead of having that silence mentioned 
during a court case against him, Salinas would have been able to tell the 
officer his intentions to remain silent were in an effort to preserve his Fifth 
Amendment right.  Perhaps, Salinas would not be in jail if the provision 
was used.256 
The same can be said for Gerry, the man who chose to remain silent 
during the Terry stop.  If Gerry had been read this model code, he would 
have known his rights.  He would have been able to make a better 
educated decision about whether he was accomplishing what he thought 
he was accomplishing by remaining silent without specifically invoking 
his Fifth Amendment privilege.  The man would have known that 
remaining mute was not sufficient to invoke the privilege.  He would have 
been able to tell the officer that he was remaining silent.  That would have 
been all that was needed.  The Court acknowledges there are no magic 
words, just that the person provide to officers a reasonable expression of 
intent that he is invoking the right to remain silent. 
The proposed pre-arrest model code provides a warning for all pre-
arrest suspects.  Simply remaining silent is not the correct way to protect 
the right to remain silent.  The Court has been clear that to protect the 
right, it must be expressly invoked.  Unfortunately, even the Miranda 
warning is not read to suspects until they are in police custody.  The 
citizens who are not in custody are not afforded the same precautions to 
protect their rights.  There is no warning for citizens in non-custodial 
interrogations, only custodial interrogations.  The proposed model code 
will provide a precaution to citizens.  It will warn them at the same time 
it is educating them how to ensure they are protecting themselves from 
incriminating statements or actions. 
Without the adoption of the model code, the government will 
continue to narrow the Fifth Amendment privilege.  The model code is an 
effective tool that is efficient for states to incorporate through adoption, 
and can be applied uniformly in all the states.  Absent such a code, 
citizens’ rights will continue to be infringed upon because there is not a 
                                                 
255 See supra Part I (introducing the hypothetical similar in fact pattern to the Salinas case). 
256 See generally Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (permitting the prosecutor to use Salinas’ reactions 
during questioning as evidence of his guilt).  The ballistics to his gun matched, so most likely 
he would still be in jail, but his silence would not have been able to be used against him.  
Salinas v. Texas, 369 S.W.3d 176, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 
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pre-arrest warning explaining what their rights are and how to protect 
them.  The model code limits the infringement of rights and uniformly 
applies Salinas. 
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